

Book Reviews

Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World: System, Scale, Culture. Edited by DAVID PALUMBO-LIU, BRUCE ROBBINS, and NIRVANA TANOUKHI. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011. 272 pp. \$84.95 (cloth); \$23.95 (paper).

The title of this curious volume refers to not one but three problems of the “world.” First, how can scholars in varied disciplines across the social sciences and humanities grapple with their intellectual objects of study after the “global turn” and its critique of preexisting conceptual and theoretical frameworks of a “national” bent? Where do the boundaries (even fuzzy ones) begin and end, say, for French literature or West African art? Second, for those with pretensions toward a “global” social science, can the particularisms and caveats of humanities scholarship provide a check on the reductionist tendencies that lurk beneath “big history” and its proponents? Third, given the persistence of unequal economic, political, and social hierarchies on a world scale, how relevant is the production of knowledge, especially in the contemporary humanities, for the elucidation and reduction of such inequalities? Should we be “overjoyed,” the editors write, “to think of the world’s cultures as equal and equally modern if so much else in the world remains so unequal?” (p. 9).

Throughout Immanuel Wallerstein’s lifelong intellectual project, the three editors note, the key explanandum has always been the colossal inequality for an individual’s life chances depending on whether one was born in Dakar, Doha, Dushanbe, or Des Moines. Wallerstein

created and developed a conceptual and theoretical toolkit to deal with this question: world-systems analysis. Scholars can (and many have) taken umbrage with some of his particular arguments: capitalism began in the sixteenth century, not in the nineteenth; modern slavery is as capitalist a form of labor as waged work; the political and economic power of the United States is in irreversible decline; and capitalism is a historical system whose time is nearly over. Yet, regardless of the debates that Wallerstein's undertaking spawned (and perhaps spurned), the stark realities of our crisis-ridden age demand a "perspective of the world." The volume's editors, all working in the humanities themselves, utilize the challenge of Wallerstein's project to take an uncompromising look at their own disciplines and invite others to do the same.

To a large extent, then, this volume is a critical appreciation of the global turn that Wallerstein helped to generate. As with most edited volumes born of conferences, however, the book arguably suffers from "uneven development." Some chapters directly address Wallerstein's oeuvre; others engage in conceptual dances—beautiful and baroque—with the terms of system, scale, or culture; and a few seem tacked on for inscrutable reasons of disciplinary affirmative action. Yet the clarion call is noble: The late nineteenth-century intellectual divide and *Methodenstreit* between the "two cultures," as David Palumbo-Liu points out, was long ago labeled by Wallerstein as a "sham" (p. 209). This edited volume does not propose a new path forward, by any means, but it certainly blocks the way back.

The editors begin by arguing that while the post-Cold War academic promotion of "alternative modernities" for trajectories of African, Asian, or Latin American history might have alleviated the postcolonial stigma of inferiority in the cultural sphere, the same celebration of localized self-expression also masked the global hierarchies of social, economic, and political structures that persist to the present. Several authors in the volume reference James Ferguson's disciplinary autocritique that for most individuals on the African continent, "modernity" is not to be delivered via the liberation which comes from fluid and playful cultural self-production but rather from the actual economic convergence between North and South that, under actually existing capitalism, remains the wishful thinking of the naïve and the deceived. To this reader, whipped into disciplinary submissiveness through the travails of academic life, it is a blunt reminder that the most powerful criticisms of any academic field can often emerge from within the disciplinary apparatus itself, even though these critiques

tend to remain voices in the wilderness later to be unearthed by opportunists in other fields.

The volume's able contributors then ply their trades. Richard Lee, a dutiful practitioner of world-systems analysis, succinctly shows how Wallerstein's intellectual venture was both a product of the capitalist world-system emanating from the global upheavals of 1968 as well as a project of political and intellectual intervention into the existing structures of knowledge inherited by a young Africanist. Bruce Robbins provokes that the seeming antitheses of world-systems analysis's *histoire total* and post-structuralist humanities both tended to inflict quietest, depoliticizing effects for the roles of (Western) academics in their own guilty perpetuation of global hierarchies. Karen Wigen uses the historical shifts in ocean cartography over the life of the capitalist world-system to interrogate how varied eras have mapped the hitherto known world. Her chapter ends with the cheeky but apt warning that the academic genre of "world history" ought not to end up repeating the mistakes of the cultural genre of "world music"—a saccharine marketing device sold on National Public Radio rather than a self-reflexive and inclusive domain of intellectual critique (p. 152). In a brilliant chapter, Helen Stacy swiftly shows how the utilization of a discourse of international law originated not within a post-Nuremburg zeitgeist, but rather with the initial expansion of the capitalist world economy into the Americas in the sixteenth century. The contractual equality promised by international legal doctrine was irrevocably intertwined with the structural inequality of geopolitical intrigue, continuing through Enlightenment, imperialist, Cold War, and humanitarian variations up to the present era of handwringing over Libya and Iran.

Neil Brenner and Franco Moretti, using Wallerstein as foil and interlocutor, put forth well-oiled chapters boiled down from earlier books. One could protest here that Wallerstein's abstract terminology may too easily function as a straw man, while his reading and reconstruction of historical patterns over the past five centuries—to be found by diligent readers in the empirical meat of his four volumes of *The Modern World-System*—is more difficult to refute if the theoretical implications are taken seriously. Gopal Balakrishnan adds a useful but woefully brief engagement with this aspect of Wallerstein's output. He ends with an ominous portent that if the structural crisis of capitalism that Wallerstein long predicted comes to pass, the structures of knowledge and the institutions of higher learning that produced such a vigorous critique as Wallerstein's will undoubtedly be brought down with it.

For sympathetic readers, the end product is neither a tower of Babel nor a roadmap for revolutionizing their own departments and disci-

plines. At best, it is a preparation, an armament, and a carapace for the battles to be fought as a new era of global crises encompasses and invigorates the intellectual fields that, one can only hope, will be reconstituted in the same spirit with which Immanuel Wallerstein approached the structures of knowledge of his predecessors.

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Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a Connected World. By DOMINIC SACHSENMAIER. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 340 pp. \$94.00 (cloth); \$33.99 (paper); \$27.00 (e-book).

This book studies the institutional and conceptual landscape that has sustained and shaped world historical scholarship. This is new terrain for intellectual query and therefore the book is to be much appreciated for that. For many academics who teach global history, the introductory remarks to students need no longer seek justification in the lived realities. They can very well point to a read like this for a thorough historiographical reflection on when, where, and how, or the contingency of global historical outlooks. The book appends such approaches to transnational trends, academic structures and interactions, and the specific national political and social contexts of the United States, Germany, and China.

Border-crossing historiography as such has a deep history. In the earliest of times world historical writings were undergirded by a conception of space on the broadest scale and marked by religious, cultural, and ethical centrality. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries global historiography became distinctively secular. In Europe and elsewhere, the academic, university-based historiography was increasingly imbricated with nation and replete with notions of “world historical centers and peripheries” (p. 13). Outside Europe, historiography, in the garb of pedagogy for building a functional nation-state, looked at Europe as a model of rationality. This latter trend was broken with the rise of dependency theories in the pre–World War II era and of subaltern studies in the 1980s that were insurgent voices against the assumptions in prior theories that took Europe as a model.

The “space” of reference for global historiography has evolved with time. But the author consistently examines the global conditions amid which theories have emerged and receded from prominence. The

“global” as an analytic, in Sachsenmaier’s understanding, is “a compound web of overlapping local, regional, national, and global formations” (p. 39). In addition, the global is not topographically flat, but is rather imbued with hierarchies. This becomes an entry point in the book to discuss in a critical way the output of theories globally with regard to unequal power equations in the comity of nations, varied institutional resources undergirding academic and professional historiography in different settings, and the sheer dominance of certain languages in history writing. The best and most elaborate analysis of such patterns in the book appears for recent times in the twentieth century.

Moving on to examine the local contingencies of global historiography, the author first of all spotlights the heterogeneity of this body. Local differences can be potentially countless and of necessity the author focuses on three case studies. The cases he examines bring to light the far more connected world context in which important theories germinate. He demonstrates the centrality of the American academia as “a transaction hub” in the emergence of theories that challenged Eurocentrism (p. 59). The rise of area studies in the American academia and pluralization and democratization of American universities disturbed the status quo in the conceptual maps of humanities and social sciences. The unity and seamlessness of the past was questioned and elite perspectives were countered with subaltern outlooks laced with politics of identity. Such trends formed a background to the emergence of theories subsequently that were imbued with anti-hegemonic ideals.

The book has to be lauded for the examination of modernization theory and its complicated career in China. China theorists engaged with modernization in complex ways as part of a desire to accomplish positive change while going beyond their experiment with “revolution.”

The local national context strongly took hold in the German historiography. The obsession to explain the German past overrode any effort to focus on the arena external to the German nation. The few attempts at looking at the distant world were still guided by the drive to understand the authoritarianism in German past and the role of “violence” in German colonialism. Perhaps the book is admittedly focused on the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries and thus the works of early German orientalist and philologists fall outside its remit. But one would have wished for some attention to the subject in the first chapter, where the author discusses the cultural theories. The German orientalist and their perspectives intersected with ideas of racism and social Darwinism that the author indeed discusses for other contexts.

One is also left wondering what picture would obtain for the region

of Latin America in the author's scheme of things. The latter has a distinguished historiography in which the modernization theory of W. W. Rostow tangled with locally generated visions of development. In the 1970s and 1980s movements in many parts of the developing world, including Latin America, also contested the hegemonic claims of the discourse of development. This latter phase has been popularly christened as that of "post-development" by Arturo Escobar.¹ This yet-another border-crossing historiography with countervailing trends may be counted as the only one that was left yearning for attention in otherwise comprehensive coverage.

The book has to be generally commended for being a very up-to-date reference across varied regional specializations. Regardless of their ambition to explain connections, influences, and transformations over large historical spaces, global theories are still rooted in the academic traditions emanating from separate and distinct regions. The book makes a stellar attempt in terms of engaging with such dispersed historiographies in the areas that it selects to review.

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History and the Testimony of Language. By CHRISTOPHER EHRET.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010. 288 pp.
\$65.00 (cloth); \$29.95 (paper and e-book).

If you are not familiar with the work of Christopher Ehret in African historical linguistics, he is a premier scholar as well as an advocate for a wider appreciation of his field of specialization. As stated in the introduction, he has been working for forty years in the field of historical linguistics and is responsible individually or collaboratively for the reconstruction of most of the Nilo-Saharan and Afrasian (formerly Afroasiatic) language families. This book is a collection of previously published "greatest hits" of Ehret's work, assembled here to convince a broader community of historians of the importance of linguistic historical work to history writ large. It is therefore a fitting contribution to the California World History Library series. Ehret's new introduction makes a strong case for world historians and teachers of world history

¹ Arturo Escobar, "Reflections on 'Development': Grassroots Approaches and Alternative Politics in the Third World," *Futures* (1992): 411–436.

to learn the basic methods and theories of historical linguistics in order to translate the findings of this field to larger questions of world population movements, innovations in agriculture and culture, and—perhaps most importantly from an Africanist perspective—reversing the long-standing myth of an “Asiatic” introduction of cultural innovation into the Horn and southeastern Sahel. If one gets anything from Ehret’s work it is his persistent insistence on the originality of African languages and cultures and the relative preexistence of African languages to similar developments in the Asian and European world.

Ehret’s work introduces us to the role of language “stratigraphy,” which he has reconstructed for the language families he studies, primarily the Nilo-Saharan and Afrasian families. Each language stratigraphy demonstrates when innovations in farming techniques and grazing of animals and new cultural practices were integrated into the various branches each language tree. Importantly, language stratigraphy can also demonstrate the direction of innovation from one language family to another.

In chapter 3, for example, Ehret explains to the nonspecialist how historical linguists make decisions about changes in “economy, customs, cultural knowledge, or the material circumstances of life” by examining the particular stratigraphy of a language family and its branches. Ehret then uses this stratigraphy to determine when new vocabulary enters the branch, whether or not it is a borrowed word or an adaptation of an existing word to fit an innovation, and when the old words die out of the lexicon. In chapter five, Ehret introduces nonspecialists to “glottochronology,” a methodology for determining a language’s age by studying “long-term cumulative effects on lexical history” of changes in vocabulary. Ehret defends this method as a reasonable but not precise way to approximate the age of a language. This chapter is very helpful for those interested in explaining to students the dating of Bantu migrations, a fundamentally important aspect of African human geography and history, and to do so using Ehret’s evidence seems an improvement on the textbook emphasis on “migration” that lacks both sophistication and an appreciation of the “slowness” of the Bantu expansion as well as its impact on populations already present, such as the Khoisan in southern Africa and the Nilo-Saharan groups in northeastern Africa. Ehret discusses the adaptation and/or expansion of language families and branches in the context of these major changes in material culture, such as architecture or pottery, as demonstrated by archeological findings. A useful data table provides Ehret’s dating correlations for various African languages (p. 128).

The science of determining the age of language groups remains a

difficult one, but Ehret is not afraid to put forward his own hypotheses. For example, in chapter 6, Ehret shows that the Proto-Afrasian language family was likely around some fifteen thousand years ago, which makes it nine thousand years older than the Proto-Indo-European language, which Ehret places as “generally accepted” to have originated six thousand years ago (p. 145). As the recent debate over the dating of Indo-European language has shown (is it now four thousand or nine thousand years old?), there will likely be challenges to Ehret’s dating of the proto-Afrasian origins in the future. Ehret admits that this dating remains speculative, and suggests his calculations are based on evidence of major climate change in the Sahel and the Mediterranean (pp. 156, 164).

An interesting example of the power of Ehret’s language histories is his ability to answer questions about whether or not early Afrasian cultures were cultivators of grains. He is confident, given the stratigraphy of proto-Afrasian languages, that Afrasian speakers used grains and had a vocabulary for wild grains but lacked words related to the cultivation of grains. Similarly, Ehret tests whether or not early Afrasian populations were herders of domestic animals. By showing the absence of terms related to herding, with the exception of borrowed words from Asia to Africa for goats and sheep “beginning between 6500 and 6000 BCE” (p. 151), Ehret suggests that the earlier Afrasian cultures were not herders of domesticated animals. In the same vein, Ehret shows how linguistic stratigraphies of the Nilo-Saharan language family point to “early cattle raisers of the southern eastern Sahara between 8500 and the sixth millennium BCE,” as well as evidence of “possible cultivation” of grains, and the “appearance of sheep and goats,” after 7000 B.C.E. (p. 153). Ehret’s reconstructed language family trees demonstrate when terms were adopted, transformed, or dropped from the lexicon. There are other important examples provided of loan words traveling from the southeastern Sahelian regions to ancient Egypt and Asia as well.

Chapter 7 explores the interesting path of Ethiosemitic languages in the Ethiopian highlands and how the language was likely first introduced by a minority group of traders that eventually replaced Cushitic language populations in the first millennium B.C.E. (p. 182). Chapter 8 explores how historical linguists are able to reconstruct extinct languages by locating two or more branches of an earlier language and then seeing what happens to common vocabulary in both branches as they develop and transform into something new. Ehret brings us through highlights in this process by comparing Taita Cushitic A and

Taita Cushitic B. By showing the unique adaptations to “their sound-change histories” of both subgroups, Ehret demonstrates how historical linguists determine commonality with extinct languages, from which a language stratigraphy of the extinct language can be developed.

Ehret’s work is of great value to world historians. Many of the case studies could be used to draw attention to African societies that existed prior to the “great African civilizations” format usually deployed to teach the survey. As Ehret suggests, just as linguistic history is essential for archeologists and anthropologists, it should become more essential for historians. For those who want to bring African language history into the modern world history survey, chapter 9 (“Cultural Diffusion in the Atlantic Age: American Crops in Eastern Africa”) will be very helpful for preparing lectures and for students to read. When we teach about East Africa in the nineteenth century, we tend to focus on slave and ivory trading routes and the development of powerful military leaders within the interior who can control such routes. Ehret’s chapter shows how new world crops also traveled these trade routes and how Kiswahili-speaking traders were mostly responsible for the introduction of maize, sweet potatoes, tobacco, and rice into interior regions. Here the time frame of language adaptation is much briefer, decades rather than millennia, showing the reader the importance of historical linguistics not only for the reconstruction of the cultural origins of African populations, but also for the quick adaptation and Africanization of new material and cultural trends in modern history.

Just as African history is often taught in world history through material culture, Ehret makes a convincing argument for doing the same with language itself as the representation of historical change and adaptation. On one end of his historical timeline, Ehret demonstrates African innovations in language and culture predating that of similar Indo-European innovations. At much more recent points of the timeline, he argues that the survival of African languages again relies on the capacity of African languages and cultures to adapt and incorporate new materials and ideas from Asia, Europe, and the New World to local environments. World historians will come away from Ehret’s work with a much broader appreciation of how historical linguistics can unlock one of the most essential elements of African history—innovation, adaptation, and incorporation of successive generations when confronted by environmental, cultural, and economic stresses.

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The Sri Lanka Reader: History, Culture, Politics. Edited by JOHN CLIFFORD HOLT. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011. 792 pp. \$109.95 (cloth); \$34.95 (paper).

This review can be summarized in two statements. First, this is a must-have book for all Sri Lankan scholars. Second, given the number of important scholars missing, one feels the need for a second parallel reader.

The book was put together by John Holt, and it probably entailed much pondering and hair-pulling over what to include and what to exclude. It is divided up into five sections: "from Ancient to Modern" (106 pp.); "the Colonial Encounter" (195 pp.); "Emerging Identities" (258 pp.); "Independence, Insurrections, and Social Change" (119 pp.); and "Political Epilogue" (18 pp.). The sections are organized temporally. The strengths of this book are that the articles are short, direct, and well written. One does not have to labor through jargon and convoluted arguments.

I begin my overall assessment of the book with negatives and then work to the positives. My assessments are shaped by my career as an anthropologist who has worked in "village Sri Lanka." Village Sri Lanka, the everyday life of Sri Lankans, is mostly missing in this book. Martin Wickramasinghe reflects on the simple pleasures of growing up in a village, and that's about it. We do not learn about the religion, culture, or politics of family life, birth, growing up, marriage, death, cooking, shopping, and so on. We do read about gender in the contexts of migration, working in a textile factory, and living as Tamil refugees. There are snippets of everyday life sprinkled here and there, but the local, outside the urban areas (predominantly Kandy and Colombo), is looked at, if at all, through a telescope. The scale or frame of the texts is steadfastly national or subjective, not local or intersubjective.

How can one have a "reader" of Sri Lanka without including one word from Gananath Obeyesekere? Where is Daniel Valentine on Tamils and tea estates? Instead the chapter on tea estates by Wickremeratne centers mostly on the economic reliance on and benefits of the tea industry and elides Valentine's "*perumal* cut." Imagine Wickremeratne's economically based article on the tea estate on one side of a teeter-totter and Valentine's Tamil estate laborer chopping a precise *perumal*-sized cut from the colonist's planter's arm on the other and then note that the teeter-totter rests firmly on the ground on the side of Wickremeratne's tea estate, and that is what the strength and problem of this reader are in a nutshell.

It is not the raw footage and notice of colonial wrongs that are miss-

ing (there are articles on this), but rather the lives of ordinary people outside the urban penumbras of Kandy and Colombo. Gamburd's and Lynch's articles provide a bit of counterbalance. Leach, Kapferer, Qadri Ismail, Deborah Winslow, Robert Stirrat, John Rogers, Jonathan Spencer, James Brow, Carla Risseuw, Sandya Hewamanne, Mike Woost, and Mark Whitaker are among the missing. A few of the above would be understandable; inclusion of some would have strengthened the book. There is too much emphasis on religion as text or as infused with politics rather than as precepts and practices. In the section on emerging identities, the first identity is Buddhist, and a more complete Sinhala identity is missing. When introducing the set or readings on Tamil identities, the editor writes, "the question of an emergent Tamil identity is every bit as complicated, if not more so, as the question of Sinhala and Muslim identities" (p. 458). Thus, in accordance with Obeyesekere's equation, Sinhala and Buddhist are equated, but apparently not Tamil and Hindu or Islam and Muslim. Further, none of these identities are "emergent," they have been around for a while. It is a bit of a mess. One might argue that they are emerging as ethno-political identities, but the counterargument might be, "Well everything is emerging all the time, so what else is new? And while we are at it, how do we delineate identities as a particulate concept?"

There is mention of Sri Lanka's unusually high HDI but there is no analysis as to why it is so high. The rich recent impact of NGOs, as Michael Woost has ably demonstrated, has had a tremendous impact on the everyday culture and politics of Sri Lankans, yet this is not addressed in the book. The reader comes away thinking that Sri Lanka is like a pinball game, action packed, turbulent identities insufflated with nervous energy; there is never a mundane moment. Yet, some real problems in Sri Lanka are absent: the rise in pederasty and kidnappings of young boys for sex trafficking, prostitution, the growth in economic inequality between classes, environmental and especially water pollution, and the erosion of soils.

Most chapters are fine in themselves, but often they lack citations or the justification for an argument. For instance, in an otherwise excellent article, Jane Russell notes that "Much of the homeostatic nature of Jaffnese society can be laid at the feet of the colonial powers. The Portuguese invasion of the sixteenth century effectively fossilized Jaffnese Hinduism, as it severed the communication between the peninsula and the roots of its culture in the South Asian mainland" (pp. 472–473). Yet, later on she writes how "Indian newspapers were widely read in Jaffna and quite a few students went from the peninsula to study in Madras" (p. 476). It is the challenge of such a huge undertaking that

problems such as this are inevitable and not infrequent; things slip by. There is also a lot of poetry; for some the translator is cited and other times not. I frankly did not like most of the modern poetry; perhaps it's simply me, but take the following passage, referring to "Black July," when Sinhalese hooligans rampaged through Tamil areas across the country (p. 648): "As one grows older / the pebbles grow too / into great stones and / rocks hurled with violence / smashed skulls spilled brains / splattering the pavements." Need one go on? Of course, an apt response to this complaint is, "It is not your book. Write your own and quit complaining."

Now let us move to the positives, free of residual irritation. The chapters are necessarily short, succinct, and easy to read. In particular, the two chapters by K. M. De Silva and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, respectively, Tambiah's chapter on the 1983 riots plus selected excerpts from original sources and Sri Lankan voices (including especially the important chapters in the section on Muslim identities) are informative and make this reader a worthwhile buy. Excerpts from the *Mahāvamsa*, which open the book, and the *Culavamsa* provide a nice touch. Excerpts from Fa Hsien and Ibn Batutu enrich the book, particularly since, if many readers are like me, they have heard of these visitors but never read their work.

Each section begins with an introduction and an italicized explanation for the inclusion of the chapter and précis of its content. These are very helpful for the reader in selecting what to read or skip over. The chapters in section 4, "Independence, Insurrections and Social Change," are generally excellent, providing, in the main, snapshots of rising ethnic and class violence since independence. This section closes with a tendentious reflection on the 2004 tsunami and its aftermath. It is an acknowledgment of the personal ruin left in its wake and suggests that unlike independence, humans are ultimately dependent on nature for survival.

The epilogue is a collection of editorials following the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009. They resonate stridently with each other and suggest that, not unlike Vietnam or most any war, politicians and those who vote them in learn little from the tragedies of war. The most powerful and moving piece of the entire book, in my opinion, was the posthumous letter by Lasantha Wickrematunga that was to be published in his newspaper, the *Sunday Leader*, in the event of his assassination, which, the letter makes clear, he understood was a certainty. The letter, available on the Internet, portrays both Sinhala and universal human virtue at its highest. It is therefore ironic that the book closes with an article assessing the fragility of Sri Lankan democracy and inveigling

the possibility that current president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, has the popularity and interest to be made king. It is doubtful that this is plausible or that President Rajapaksa has such designs. Yet this dialectical “tale of two cultural heroes” develops, it seems to me, intentionally or not, the main theme for this book, and the outcome remains uncertain.

In sum, though the book has some marvelous chapters, it is inevitable that they vary in quality. All the chapters are readable and add a piece of insight and knowledge into one’s fragmented view of a nation. No nation, perhaps no village, can be captured in a single reader, and one should not expect that. Instead, one should wish a discerning variety of perspectives that offer substantive snapshots, some of which motivate further examination or provide a point of view the reader either was not aware of or had not yet read in any detail. This book satisfies these criteria, and all in all, it is a job well done.

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The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Edited by TOURAJ DARYAEE. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 432 pp. \$150.00 (cloth).

The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History surveys the greater Persian world from the Paleolithic period to the present. The editor, Touraj Daryaee, explains that what distinguishes this book from others is its balanced treatment of ancient, medieval, and modern Iran. Its sixteen chapters are written by a distinguished group of scholars and are chronologically organized as follows: Iran’s prehistory to the Iron Age (Kamyar Abdi), the Elamites (Daniel T. Potts), Avestan society (Prods Oktor Skjærvø), the Achaemenids (A. Shapour Shahbazi), Alexander and the Seleucids (Evangelos Venetis), the Arsacids (Edward Dąbrowa), the Sasanians (Touraj Daryaee), the early Islamic period (Michael G. Morony), medieval Iran (Neguin Yavari), the Mongols (George E. Lane), the Timurids and Turcomans (Ali Anooshahr), the Safavids (Kathryn Babayan), their eighteenth-century successors (Kamran Scot Aghaie), the Qajars (Mansoureh Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi), the Pahlavis (Afshin Matin-Asgari), and the Islamic Republic (Maziar Behrooz).

This narrative explores the historical development of Iran not only as a political entity but also as a cultural idea. Daryaee insists that although Iran is now a nation-state with clearly defined frontiers,

it must be understood as a much more geographically expansive cultural world, which he calls *Iranshahr* ("Land of the Iranians"), covering large areas of the contemporary Middle East and Central Asia. The Sasanian king, Ardashir I, used "*Iranshahr*" in a third century inscription to denote the vast territory over which he claimed rule by the authority of the Zoroastrian deity Ohrmazd (Ahura Mazda). The relatively late appearance of the term, however, together with the fact that the oldest surviving Avestan manuscripts can be traced back only to originals dating from about 1000 C.E., limits our understanding of what Iran may have signified in earlier periods, as Yavari observes.

The book's expansive temporal, geographical, and cultural framework nevertheless is useful in highlighting the historical processes that have contributed to a sense of Iran as both unique and cosmopolitan. Despite its shifting territorial, linguistic, ethnic, and cultural boundaries, the contributors describe how Iran came to be identified with a distinctive land, language, and history. Medieval and modern Iranian political ideals, for instance, were informed by culturally specific notions of monarchy, justice, and legitimacy associated with ancient imperial dynasties. The Safavid's institutionalization of Shi'a Islam, moreover, increasingly distinguished Iran from its Ottoman and Mughal neighbors. Finally, the encounter with the West since 1800 played a key role in fostering Iranian nationalism and the Islamic Republic's jealous regard for Iranian sovereignty and independence.

The authors, however, also make clear that these elements of Iran's particularity have developed in constant and creative tension with broader patterns shaping Afro-Eurasia. Empire was one such pattern. According to Shahbazi, the Achaemenid's universal imperial ambition and inclusive cultural vision made Iranians "the inheritors and guardians of the ancient Near East civilizations" (p. 120). This Achaemenid legacy would not only inform the policies and outlook of their immediate successors, the Seleucids, Arsacids, and Sasanians, but also echo centuries later in the Mongol-Iranian synthesis, which Lane explains is synonymous with the Ilkhanate. Islam further encouraged these syncretic tendencies while giving them new directions. Indeed, the making of Islam, as Yavari argues, is inextricably bound up with the making of Iran. Nizam al-Mulk's model of Islamic monarchy, with its close relationship between religion and kingship, for example, was grounded in his attempt to demonstrate the "coexistence and compatibility" of Islam with Iran's imperial past (p. 238). The political fragmentation accompanying the decline of central authority in the medieval period, nonetheless, allowed for the emergence of new reli-

gious institutions in Iran, notably the *madrasa* (Islamic college) and *khanqah* (Sufi lodge), which built significant social and cultural solidarities across the wider Islamic world. Finally, Iranian modernity must be understood within a global context shaped by imperialism, nationalism, and world war. Matin-Asgari reminds us that Reza Shah was not an atavistic "Oriental despot," but rather an autocratic, modernizing nationalist, who is best understood in comparison with other inter-war leaders such as Lenin, Mussolini, and, especially, Atatürk. Viewed against this long history of global engagement, Iran's current political, socioeconomic, and cultural isolation appears as unprecedented as it is unfortunate.

The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History's comprehensiveness, nonetheless, is both a strength and a weakness. According to its publisher, the Handbook series aims to provide "an authoritative and state-of-the-art survey of current thinking and research in a particular subject area," which provides "critical examination of the progress and direction of debates." The sheer chronological and geographical scope of the Iranian past, however, renders the attempt to combine historical and historiographical surveys in a single volume a daunting, if not impossible, task. Although the authors supply bibliographies, identify historical sources, and reference historiographical debates, historical narrative, especially political narrative, predominates. The inclusion of a chapter surveying general trends in Iranian historiography would have perhaps helped remedy this imbalance. This issue is evident in Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi's chapter on Qajar Iran. While she justly points out that the Qajars' historical reputation is due for historiographical rehabilitation, her chapter's lack of endnotes and bibliography leave students of modern Iran with little guidance as to how this important task might be accomplished. This chapter's chronological errors in dating the constitutionalists' capture of Tehran and the overthrow of Muhammad 'Ali Shah in 1907 (should read 1909) (p. 337) and the evacuation of the Muhajirin from Tehran in 1916 (should read 1915) (p. 341) are also distracting. These criticisms notwithstanding, *The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History* serves as a concise, useful introduction to and convenient, authoritative reference for many topics in the field.

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Chivalry in Medieval England. BY NIGEL SAUL. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011. 440 pp. \$35.00 (cloth).

Nigel Saul's most recent work seeks to integrate medieval chivalry more fully into the larger narrative of English history. He not only analyzes the development of chivalry as a military code of behavior for the aristocracy, but he also considers the cultural and political aspects of knighthood. By doing so, he provides an important account of how chivalry extended well beyond the battlefield and helped to shape the cosmology of the medieval nobility.

The work is largely structured chronologically. In the first part, he considers the development of chivalry during the High Middle Ages. He then pauses to consider the relationship of chivalry to other aspects of medieval society, from economics to literature. He then finishes with a discussion of the decline of chivalry in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In the first part, Saul outlines the factors for the development and expansion of chivalry in England, arguing that chivalry began in England in 1066 with the Norman Conquest of William I the Conqueror. The Norman military strategy of ransoming to protect nobles' lives was supported in part because of the lucrative nature of chivalry from 1066 to 1204 as knights' services were constantly needed by the crown, who likewise was able to generate revenue from feudal duties of service. His principal examples are William Marshal, whose success in tournaments resulted in the wealth and status needed to win high royal favor and influence, and Richard the Lionheart, who successfully used warfare to legitimize increases in royal prerogatives.

In the next few chapters, Saul considers how knighthood was reinforced by Church and state. In chapter 3, Saul considers how knighthood was idealized and Christianized so as to confer divine sanction on warfare. In the period from 1204 to 1290, he examines the decline in knights due to changing economic and social conditions, such as their desire to display their status through finery and moated manor homes, and the growing division between knights and magnates. Chivalry was then reinforced by Edward I to serve his military needs. When offering to pay knights for service failed, Edward recognized that honor might be a more powerful incentive. By popularizing tournaments and reviving Arthurian legends, he greatly encouraged knight participation in his campaigns by raising the status of doing so. These trends are continued in chapter 6, which examines the period from 1327 to 1399. Edward III, likewise, saw value in prompting chivalry among his knights, as evidenced by the creation of the Order of the Garter, and he took it further by having it confirmed by God in the cult of St. George.

It is the rejection of these values by his successor Richard II that ultimately contributed to his downfall.

Having outlined the early history of chivalry, Saul turns his attention to a series of chapters that engage in different aspects of chivalry. Saul examines the economics of knightly warfare both as a reflection of desires for material wealth and as evidence for chivalric prowess. He then considers the rules or laws of chivalry. In addition to outlining the development of formal codes, he also argues that earlier norms regarding appropriate violence were effective in restraining behavior because of the high value and honor associated with chivalry. Paradoxically, the value placed on avoiding battle meant that harrying of villages and peasants was common in the actual practice of warfare. In chapter 9, Saul explains why knighthood and nobility were initially joined in the High Middle Ages but knighthood declined in esteem in the Later Middle Ages. Part of the reason for this is that the lineage reflected in a coat of arms could be inherited in easier ways than knighthood, and knighthood carried military obligations that one might wish to avoid. It is also partly due the growth of the gentry, who were distinct from the nobility.

Saul then analyzes the complex relationship between chivalry and violence. While chivalry promoted heroic violence as proof of manliness and prowess, it also imposed restraint by prioritizing the values of courtliness, moderation, and benevolence. Saul then returns to his earlier discussion of the role of Christianity in chivalry, as ecclesiastical authorities legitimized knightly violence in defense of the Church as God's will. As he notes, this support extended from rhetoric to even administrative assistance of England's army. This theme is continued in chapter 12, which outlines the role of chivalry in crusading. These chapters reflect one structural weakness of the work. By pulling these thematic chapters out of his chronological focus, it is not always clear how they fit in the historical narrative, and there is some redundancy. Their value, however, is unquestionable.

The next chapters demonstrate Saul's success in connecting the social and military aspects of chivalry. He discusses how fortifications not only served as practical defensive structures but could also be used as symbolic displays of wealth and status. Saul's chapter on chivalry and women largely follows the work of Georges Duby in explaining the paradox of courtly romance—the glorification of adulterous love with the lord's wife. He pinpoints the rise of primogeniture (only the eldest son inherits) as responsible for creating generations of landless younger sons who were the audience for such stories. He also emphasizes the disconnection between the women idealized in such stories and the

reality of subjection for aristocratic women. In chapter 15, he explores how chivalric memory was retained and the principal role of heralds, tombs, and literature in this. Saul turns more attention to such literature in following chapter.

In the final chapters, Saul returns to tracing the history of chivalry in England by examining it during the period of the Hundred Years War and the Wars of the Roses. Faced with the defeats of the later period of the Hundred Years War, many called for a reformed and reinvigorated chivalry that would restore honor and success to England, what Saul labels a "patriotic ethic" (p. 330). Edward IV tried to continue this trend. Unfortunately, by isolating it to the court, he failed to tap into the national dimension needed to be successful. Finally, Saul analyzes the eventual demise of chivalry. As Saul notes, there is much debate among scholars about when to date the decline of chivalry. By focusing on the heart of chivalry, the values associated with conduct in warfare, Saul dates the beginning of the end to the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. He highlights the increased violence that characterized warfare during the Hundred Years War and the Wars of the Roses.

One of the clearest strengths of the work is its considerable breadth. Many studies of English chivalry focus on either its beginning or its decline. By considering it throughout the entire medieval period, Saul provides the reader with a deeper understanding of its inherent and contingent features. He also does a remarkable job of situating chivalry in the context of a number of different social, economic, and political considerations. As one of the principal experts on medieval English chivalry, this work is a very complete and accessible entry into the field. It would be of clear value to advanced students starting to research this topic, and many parts of it would generate interesting discussion in advanced coursework.

Because the work appears to be written for a largely general audience or advanced students, however, much of the current historiography on chivalry is not addressed. Saul is successful in avoiding many of the issues by adopting a middle ground approach between those who wish to see chivalry as a courtly code of ideal behavior to constrain violence and those who see it as a system to legitimize and perpetuate violence in practice. As he states early in the work, "Medieval chivalry was more an outlook than a doctrine, more a lifestyle than an explicit ethical code. It embraced both ideology and social practice" (p. 3). In contrast to this middle ground approach, he consistently references the conclusions of those who support a feudal revolution and see the tenth century as one marked by new and significant noble violence

without reference to the vigorous debate on this issue. It is presented in a way that suggests it is historical fact instead of a particular interpretation of the period. By not directly referencing different scholarly approaches to chivalry, even in footnotes, the work fails to engage with the debates that dominate the field. This is a shame given Saul's tremendous knowledge and analytical sophistication in the area.

As Saul notes, the legacy of medieval chivalry is noteworthy. He posits that it had an essential role in the development of protections for prisoners of war to ensure their humane treatment. He also argues that chivalry was critical in the development of the individual, laying "the foundations of the modern cult of celebrity" (p. 369). As such, this work represents a critical and comprehensive addition to our knowledge on the development of chivalry in medieval England.

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History without Borders: The Making of an Asian World Region, 1000–1800. By GEOFFREY C. GUNN. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011. 444 pp. \$60.00 (cloth).

History without Borders is not just an Asian-centered world history. It is a Southeast Asian-centered world history. It is not only an attempt to "re-orient" world history, in response to the call of scholars like Janet Abu-Lughod, Andre Gunder Frank, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Takeshi Hamashita for an Asian perspective, but also distinguishes itself from these earlier Asian-centered world historians by taking Southeast Asia, rather than territorial or maritime China or India (or the Indian Ocean), as its starting point and as the central axis of the book. It is also grounded in water and trade. It might not be the first to write Southeast Asia into world history and vice versa, given Anthony Reid's *An Age of Commerce*, Victor Lieberman's *Strange Parallels*, and Craig Lockard's *Southeast Asia in World History*, but it departs from all three in its time frame and its ultimate aim of writing an Asian-centered and maritime-based world history.

The time frame of Gunn's work is also rather different from earlier Asia-centered world histories, which had used the chronologies of European expansion, the emergence and spread of Islam (Abu-Lughod), and the Ming engagement with China (Anthony Reid). Recent works by Southeast Asian historians have also sought to push back what Reid (1993) had termed the Age of Commerce to circa 900 (Wade, 2009).

Instrumental in this periodization (from 1000 C.E. onward) and highlighting the importance of East-Southeast Asian interactions in this scheme would be the advent of private Chinese trade to Southeast Asia during the Song dynasty.

Gunn begins with a discussion of the recent works positing an Asian world history, from what he calls the East Asian Regionalism school to the Indian Ocean specialists, with the aim of outlining an approach to a “Long Orient-First” world history. Encapsulated within this discussion is the problem of conceptualizing East and Southeast Asia as a region. Following Takeshi Hamashita, Denys Lombard, and Francois Gipouloux, and perhaps the recent works of Angela Schottenhammer, Gunn posits the idea of an Oriental Mediterranean and the role of water in the framing of an East Asian region that incorporates Southeast Asia. In his schema, and one might say that that is where he departs from Schottenhammer, maritime Southeast Asia is the center of this frame rather than maritime China.

The centrality of Southeast Asia in this world history is clear in the structure of his book. His next few chapters chart the early history of Southeast Asia, from the prehistoric and early historic periods and the rise and fall of the “charter” kingdoms. Processes receiving attention included the development of different metal technologies, the Austro-nesian migrations, and Indian trade and “civilizational” transfers.

In the chapters on Islamic courts and maritime ports, and tribute trade and Chinese diasporas, respectively, he surveys the roles of the Indian Ocean and East Asian connections, both in the spread of Islam to maritime island Southeast Asia as well as the changing modes of exchange and flows of commodities and people between China and Southeast Asia. The importance of trade in his approach is seen in the separate chapter on commerce, currencies, and commodities, dealing with coinages in Southeast Asia as well as East–Southeast Asian commodity connections.

This is followed by his discussion of the European interactions with Southeast and East Asia, namely the Iberian “maritime networks,” and what he called the “hegemonic sequence” of the Dutch and English trading companies. In the rest of the book, he goes beyond the conventional historiography of maritime Southeast Asia between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, which had hitherto focused on European expansion and spices, by incorporating recent research trends that have posited the continuity of earlier intra-Asian flows and systems during the period of European expansion. Thus Japanese diasporic communities in Southeast Asia, the intra-Asian bullion trade networks, the global ceramic trade (and the East–Southeast Asia axis),

and knowledge transfers all receive analysis in separate chapters and highlight the limits of Eurocentric perspectives and foci in the history of maritime Asia.

Important questions remain, however. One wonders why, other than the problem of space, he excluded the Indian Ocean from this discussion. European preeminence in the Indian Ocean–Southeast Asian trade might have been a factor, although the discussions of the European expansions provide little analysis of commercial flows and movements. Is it also possible, therefore, to include South Asia within this “Oriental Mediterranean” connected by the sea?

The chapter on Islam and Islamization does deal with the Indian Ocean, but focuses more on religious influence than commercial connections. Would a discussion of commercial flows in addition and in relation to the conventional Islamization narrative provide a rather different picture of the Indian Ocean spaces? Could there have been a new maritime diplomatic exchange system emerging with Islamization and parallel to the East Asian tributary trade system?

This book should be judged on its whole rather than its parts. It presents an important attempt at the writing of a world history from the Southeast Asian perspective. Specialists might be critical of the lack of in-depth analysis for each of the chapters and the very important themes they grappled with, but the main concern of this book is an attempt at a new synthesis of recent developments in maritime Asian and world history with older narratives. It offers an alternative framing of the history of precolonial Southeast Asia and maritime Asia, especially for the period between 1500 and 1800. Like Anthony Reid’s *Age of Commerce*, Victor Lieberman’s *Strange Parallels*, and Lockard’s *Southeast Asia in World History*, this book pushes the frontiers of Southeast Asian historiography vis-à-vis global history. It advocates not only the writing of world history into Southeast Asian historiography, but also the writing of an Asian-centered world history from Southeast Asia.

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The War on Heresy. By R. I. MOORE. Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012. 416 pp.
\$35.00 (cloth and e-book).

R. I. Moore has made some of the most significant contributions to our knowledge of religious heresy in Western Europe in the Middle

Ages. His two most influential works, *The Origins of European Dissent* and *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, reject the idea that the suppression of religious dissent from circa 1000 C.E. was a spontaneous response of faith communities to deviant religiosity or confessional diversity.¹ He established a connection between the rise of secular bureaucracies in the High Middle Ages and the legitimisation of rulers as defenders of the Church from its “enemies.” Although he moderated his position slightly in the second edition of *Persecution*, the suppression of heresy was a “top-down” process. As a result, Moore reads the early evidence for heresy as politically rather than doctrinally positioned. It is constructed in the first instance. Wherever they looked for it, powerful people “found” “heresy” of the worst kinds. This included a supposed revival of ancient Manichaeism, a “dualist” heresy, positing the existence of two gods: one good, who created souls and other “invisible things,” and one evil, who created physical things, including human bodies, in which he imprisoned human souls.

The followers of Mani were in fact long extinct, but in Moore’s schema the tenets of the heresy formed the basis of accusations against people who, until the 1140s at least, were in fact religious reformers consciously preaching a simpler form of Christianity closer to that practiced by the apostles. This indigenous movement arose from dissatisfaction not only with the wealth of the clergy, but also with the creeping encroachment of the medieval Church into every aspect of Christian life, which Moore explored further in *The First European Revolution*.² Thus Moore’s work not only places heresy within its socio-political context but also has shown that context to be causal of phenomena noted by the sources. For many scholars, before the emergence in the West in circa 1140 of a more certainly Greek-influenced dualist heresy, known to a few medieval people and the majority of historians as “Catharism,” “heretics” were in the main radical and idealistic Christians, pushing too far and too fast for reform. It is primarily Moore who was responsible for this differentiation between “heretical” movements of circa 1000 to circa 1100 C.E., and those post-circa 1140 C.E.

Now, in *The War on Heresy*, Moore now seeks to undermine “Catharism” itself as a fiction of the sources. He repositions the sect as he

¹ R. I. Moore, *The Origins of European Dissent* (London: Viking, 1977) and *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008).

² R. I. Moore, *The First European Revolution, c. 970–1215* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000).

has done with the simple, pious people labeled heretics in the previous century: as a doctrinally orthodox but anti-clerical spiritual elite amongst the laity. In all, he asserts, “the traditional story of how “medieval heresy” in which “the Cathars” played a starring role is now authoritatively challenged at almost every point . . . No attempt has yet been made to retell as a whole the story of the emergence and growth of heresy and accusations of heresy in the eleventh and twelfth century Europe in the light of new and often radically different understanding of the sources . . . To do so is the aim of this book” (p. 333). In short, he wishes to “clear away the luxuriant growth of falsehood” concerning “Catharism” (p. 10). To coin a phrase from a French school of thought influencing Moore, the medieval elite “invented” even “Catharism.”³

This is a bold assertion. If Moore is correct, *The War on Heresy* is the revolution that nonspecialist reviewers and readers have hailed it. Scholars with their careers invested in the study of “real” Catharism will be threatened by Moore’s latest conclusions and will have to grapple with them given his track record. Having said this, and as someone very much with a vested interest, I was surprised to find little here to challenge the orthodoxy concerning “Catharism.” This is essentially because of weaknesses in methodology that are wholly untypical of this historian. One major mistake underlines almost every significant new claim made about what “heresy” was and what it was not. This is a tendency to be self-referential concerning the validity of evidence, supporting new assertions by associating them with earlier assertions, rather than building a thesis from the evidence and consolidating it with more evidence. And even some of the original assertions stand up only rather shakily. Combined with an overly deferential disposition to some other new scholarship, and even the explicit and needless disparaging of his own earlier work, this undermines this long-awaited book.

The problem begins with Moore’s first major assertion concerning a dualist-free early eleventh century. He considers some “heretics” to have been Neo-Platonic but is more convinced about this at some points than at others. His “we are in the presence of neoplatonist language and therefore in one way or another of neoplatonist belief” is preceded by the comment on the trial of accused heretics in Orléans in 1022 that “Whether Stephen or Lisois had indeed strayed into heresy or were misunderstood or misrepresented there is no way of knowing”

³ M. Zerner et al., *Inventer l'hérésie? Discours polémique et pouvoirs avant l'Inquisition* (Nice: Centre d'études médiévales, 1998).

(p. 17). This is confusing. Were they drawing on Neo-Platonism or not? But once it is stated that Neo-Platonism is in evidence, it becomes a fact, so that two pages later a preacher is described as a "prophet of the sophisticated neoplatonism of the canons of Orléans" (p. 19). Then, Bishop Gerard of Cambrais's preaching to heretics is "a systematic demolition of the neoplatonist understanding of the scriptures that had been maintained at Orléans by Stephen and Lisois" (p. 43), and the Patavine Ariald of Cucciago used "the neoplatonist language that had been heard at Orléans and Monforte" (p. 79). Thus Neo-Platonism becomes a fact of eleventh-century heresy even though no sources that he cites, and none that I know of, even use the term.

When it comes to "Catharism," Moore's new case rests on a series of generalizations about the invalidity of types of sources that are discredited time and time again on the basis that he has already discredited them. To sum this up, they cannot be taken seriously if their authors went to school in Paris, were Benedictine/Cluniac or Cistercian, or were connected to Cologne. This removes an awful lot of sources from the canon. Eberwin, a monk of Steinfeld, ticks two boxes. Moore suggests that the famous letter 1143 in which the Cistercian identified two heretical groups at Cologne was in fact an attempt to manipulate Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux into going to Toulouse to confront Henry of Lausanne. Eberwin's purpose was to divert Bernard's attention from clerical corruption at Cologne. It was "to this end" that Eberwin wrote his "lively account" (p. 132). By "lively," Moore implies "imaginative."

This new interpretation really matters. Eberwin's account is traditionally taken to be the earliest indication of twelfth-century Western dualism. But, drawing heavily on Uwe Brunn, Moore has us understand that the Cologne affair had more to do with tensions in the city. Eberwin asserts that "their heresy had been hidden until now ever since the time of the martyrs, and persisted in Greece and other lands" (p. 138). Moore dismisses this as an attempt to "confirm Bernard's worst fears" (p. 138), presumably about Byzantine dualism. For Eberwin to lie about what the accused people told him to their disadvantage would have been one thing. To lie barefaced to someone like Bernard of Clairvaux must have been quite another! Moore has always had great insight into Bernard, but this suggestion of gullibility on the abbot's part undermines otherwise good material on this giant of orthodox theology in chapter 8.

Later, in spite of himself, Moore does briefly consider the possibility that what Eberwin encountered in Cologne, a city with Byzantine-Western commercial contacts, could have been Bogomil refugees fleeing west during the clampdown on their sect in Constantinople in

1143. In fact, he here puts together a stronger case than has previously been made for why dualism could have emerged in the West *exactly* when and where it did. But whilst he concludes even-handedly that Eberwin's claim about Greece "is by no means impossible," "there is no evidence to corroborate it," and because Eberwin "had his own reasons for making it up" (p. 323; i.e., to mislead Bernard), the possibility can be dismissed. In other words, the case rests on the nondemonstrable assertion that Eberwin was worried about what Bernard would uncover at Cologne.

The next unreliable witness is the Benedictine Eckbert of Schönau, connected to both Cologne and Paris. He recorded a trial of heretics at Cologne in 1163, coined the term "Cathar," and was the first to give an account of a set of heretical ideas in the West that are by definition dualist. He claims that the accused said that flesh was made by the devil, that Christ was not incarnate but just seemed to be, and that human souls were spirits cast out from heaven at the creation of the world. But Moore discredits this key witness with "We have already seen good reason for suspecting him on other occasions . . . of being ready to manipulate or even create information in the interest of his patron [Archbishop] Rainhald of Dassel" (p. 168). Moore has indeed suggested earlier and persuasively that all of the Cologne sources need to be read in the context of those for the cult of St. Ursula, which Rainhald supported. But quite how this discredits Eckbert himself is not clear, except that he would have been aware of Rainhald's preferences. Moore also makes the case that Eckbert's "thirteen sermons" used a technique developed in the Paris schools (which he attended) of "expounding the essentials of the Catholic faith by systematically rebutting propositions contrary to them, which were placed in the mouths of fictitious opponents" (p. 169). While this does not surprise—similar didactic techniques were common—Moore's only reference here is to a postgraduate thesis (although it is a very good one, by Hilbert Chiu). To Moore, it is exactly because Eckbert was trained to know what a dualist was that, when he tells us that the sect he encountered was dualist, we should not believe him. Furthermore, because, and only because, Dietrich of Deutz called heretics he wrote of "Cathars," he must have got his information from Eckbert. His "Cathars" were just "one or more of the groups of devout believers that had multiplied in the Rhineland and Low Countries" (p. 170). Like Eberwin's heretics, Moore in fact claims that they were among the followers of Norbert of Xanten, and likewise the *publicani* discovered at Oxford in the 1160s. But there is no specific evidence to link any of these groups except that Moore associates them with each other.

Most significantly, on “Catharism” in the Languedoc, Moore is certain that the 1178 abjuration of faith required of and made by Raymond Bernard and Bernard de Bamiac of Toulouse, which was anti-dualist, was again not based on what they had attested but on a model the clergy wanted to impose on them. Hence, “There are two gods, one good and one evil, the good god had created everything invisible and everything that could not be changed or corrupted, whereas the evil one created the sky, the earth, man and visible things” (p. 198) merely reflects a widespread assumption of what dualism was, as opposed to what was actually found. Geoffrey of Vigéoise also gives an account of the beliefs that Raymond Bernard and Bernard de Baimac admitted to, which is again entirely dualist and which, says Moore, informed clergy thereafter. Moore cannot prove that it was not true, any more than I could prove that it was just as Geoffrey said it was. It is indeed possible both “that as repentant heretics Raymond and Bernard were simply reporting what they knew from experience to be true” and that “they hoped to win pardon and favour . . . by confirming the expectations of their interrogators” (pp. 218–219). But this applies to very many historical sources indeed.

Moore offers even more flawed witnesses. The Paris scholar Alan of Lille, who later became a Cistercian, never met an actual dualist, just the stereotype (again drawing on Chiu, who probably ought to be published soon so that he can enter the debate on his own terms). Likewise suspect is the letter of Raymond V of Toulouse in 1177 to the abbot of Cîteaux complaining that the “two principles” were being taught in his lands. Gervaise of Canterbury recorded this about the letter, and Moore suggests that his evidence might have been not authentic or edited. The reasoning for this is that, if what Gervaise says was true, then it is surprising that Roger of Howden did not note it in his work on the same region.

The practice of discrediting witnesses on the basis that they knew other people who Moore considers not credible continues into his discussion of the thirteenth century. In spite of spending several years in Languedoc during the Albigensian Crusade, the crusades’ chronicler Peter of the Cistercian abbey of les Vaux-de-Cernay, in the Paris region, apparently got his very detailed account of Cathar belief only from his uncle Guy, who was also his abbot.

Disappointingly for many of us anticipating this book, Moore all but ignores the problematic strands of evidence for popular belief that can be unpicked from the record of the thirteenth-century Inquisition. He does use the “processus” against Peter Garcias of Toulouse, but the conclusion is again to show that because dualism is so explicitly

referred to, it must in reality be absent. Ultimately Moore concludes that such evidence for dualism is “not a historical record but a body of anecdote” (p. 321).

In this book there are not enough of Moore’s brilliant, sociologically and anthropologically informed insights that help us understand the medieval world at its base and on its own terms. I would like to see his sharp and critical mind at work on the Doat documents or Toulouse ms. 609, exploring their specific microclimates and mutual contradictions. Instead, he concentrates on what was taking place in elite circles. One such source is the report by the papal legate Conrad of Porto of what Bernard Hamilton and others have taken to be a reference to a Bogomil-initiated schism that resulted in the copying in 1223 of the controversial document known as the Saint-Félix charter.⁴ This is the major piece of evidence for an even earlier schism in the 1160s or 1170s during which the Cathars of the Languedoc apparently became “absolute dualists,” and those of Italy were so disconcerted by events and conflicting “truths” that they never fully recovered. The “traditional” interpretation of this narrative is so astonishing that it is no wonder that not all historians are convinced by it. Yet in all that has been written since Hamilton’s brilliant work first convinced Moore and others that it was true, it has not been systematically or convincingly undermined. Sadly, Moore does not attempt to do this here, or even to synthesis the work of Monique Zerner’s circle.⁵ He cites them rather than engages with them and concludes that Conrad’s account is mere “Cistercian invective” (p. 289) and that “there is no doubt that it is a forgery” (p. 289). As such, he brings little new to the debate, except that the fact that he now agrees with Zerner et al. will in and of itself be influential. Of “the place of Bulgaria or Constantinople in the origin myth,” “we cannot say how far these memories were real or invented” (p. 323). But *The War on Heresy* is a monograph of more than three hundred pages. If there is not the space here systematically to refute Hamilton’s case and engage in detail with the work of the Zerner seminars, where is there space?

The problems that are raised with these sources could be raised concerning any medieval sources. This is not to say that there are no

⁴ See especially B. Hamilton, “The Cathar Council of Saint Félix Reconsidered,” in his *Monastic Reform, Catharism and the Crusades (900–1300)* (London: Variorum, 1979), pp. 23–53.

⁵ M. Zerner et al., *L’histoire du Catharisme en discussion: Le “concile” de Saint-Félix (1167)* (Nice: Centre d’études médiévales, 2001).

insights here. In fact, there is much to keep the specialist on her toes. Moore is at his most persuasive on the third Lateran Council (1179), for example. Its wording constructs a many-headed hydra: one (dualist) enemy with many faces. In fact these were very possibly varied phenomena. But this does not eliminate the possibility of dualism being in evidence. Indeed, the most exciting new scholarship, for example that of Pilar Jiménez-Sánchez, points to a position between Catharism as clerical fiction, on the one hand, and as coherent dualist belief system, on the other, thoroughly integrated as a single southern French belief system.⁶

Ultimately, Moore's brief seems to have been on the simple side and many of the problems originate from having to produce something for a popularist market. He has been denied the familiar scholarly apparatus of frequent footnotes and full referencing. There is no proper bibliography, just some very thin and one-sided "further reading" suggestions. Indexing terms are sparse. The book must be read by everyone studying medieval heresy if only because of who wrote it. But it is far from Moore's best work to date.

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This Seat of Mars: War and the British Isles, 1485–1746.

BY CHARLES CARLTON. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2011. 336 pp. \$40.00 (cloth).

Charles Carleton's *This Seat of Mars: War and the British Isles, 1485–1746* bears the markings of a magnum opus: an ambitious thesis, an extensively broad but well-researched and footnoted manuscript, and an exploration of themes that transcend the immediate historical context of the scope of the study that can be applied to different times and situations. Moreover, the work has been produced by a veteran historian and well-established expert on military history. In this book, Carlton deals directly with the ways that warfare affected both the individual on the micro level and the state at the macro level. War is important at both of these extremes as well as everywhere in between. The main goal for Carleton here is "not to say soft things, but to exam-

⁶ *Les catharismes: Modèles dissidents du christianisme medieval (xii^e–xiii^e siècles)* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2008).

ine the hard reality of how war—which Tolstoy calls ‘the vilest thing in life’—affected the history of early modern Britain” (p. xx).

The reality of war is the driving force of this work, distinguishing it from traditional military history. Such a perspective is undoubtedly enhanced and reinforced by the author’s personal military experience as a soldier in the British Territorial Army and service as an officer in the Welsh Regiment, Special Air Service Regiment, and Intelligence Corps. Beyond this personal connection to the subject, Carleton does well to intimate the importance of realism in war in the Tudor and Stuart periods. Early in the introduction, he describes the ultimate purpose of battle in stark terms: “killing is fundamental to war” (p. xvi). It is a simple truism to be sure, but one that has frequently been neglected in macro histories of battles and campaigns of the past. It has only been in recent decades that historians have given full examination to this idea. Carleton substantiates this by stating that “by focusing on the actualities of war, on killing, by examining continuity as well as change, and by using a wide range of sources, the new military historians have transformed the discipline” (p. xix).

Part of this new approach involves using a plethora and variety of sources in constructing a representation of war in the past. Beyond the usual source material for most military histories, Carleton peppers this work with allusions to major and minor literary sources in different genres (such as sermons, diaries, and drama) to enhance the larger points he makes. For example, in a chapter about recruitment and training, Carleton cites a section of Sir Aston Cockayne’s *Trappolin* in which two characters conclude that it is better for one to be a thief than a soldier because there is less danger in stealing and a higher payout (p. 21). In discussing the influence of militarism on English culture, the author states that Christopher Marlowe, for example, likely used Raymond Fourquevaux’s *Instructions for the Warres*, a military treatise, in writing *Tamburlaine* (p. 57). Such literary knowledge adds much to Carleton’s treatment of the influence of war in England.

This Seat of Mars’s chapters alternate between macro and micro themes. This interlaced structure is effective in reiterating the basic argument made by Carleton: War affects both the state and the individual progressively. There is a general chronological advancement for the macro-level chapters, beginning with the early Tudor period in chapter 1 and arriving at the Battle of Culloden by chapter 12. The micro chapters mimic the span of a typical soldier’s life and experience. That is, the second chapter deals with joining and training, the sixth with limited combat (campaigning), and the ninth with high-level combat (battles and sieges), and the penultimate regales the soldier’s life after war.

With this organizing principle, Carleton is able to make a good case that by examining the reality of war and its effects on the individual and society, modern scholarship can better understand warfare. There are dozens of allusions to twentieth-century military figures in this, ranging from Chairman Mao to Norman Schwarzkopf. This transcendence infuses a vitality rarely seen in volumes on similar topics. Perhaps nowhere is this better understood than in the conclusion. Titled "The Hand of War," Carleton argues that "it is the legitimate killing of our fellow creatures that makes war special and decisive" (p. 261).

The concluding point is made that during the early modern period, more than one million lives were lost directly and indirectly to war in the British Isles. Of these, 60 percent were non-English fighting in primarily English wars. The burden of warfare fell disproportionately upon Irish, Scottish, and Welsh soldiers, who were among the poorest in Europe. Given this, one is reminded of the soldier in Richard Steele's *The Funeral*, who, in response to the question of why he had enlisted, answered that he was "guilty of being poor" (p. 23).

In sum, in *This Seat of Mars*, Charles Carleton has produced a well-documented and well-researched tome that is comprehensive in its treatment of the effects of war in the British Isles from 1485 to 1746. Carleton's work is highly recommended for both military historians and general scholars of the Tudor and Stuart periods.

NATHAN JAMES MARTIN

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Cultural Hierarchy in Sixteenth-Century Europe: The Ottomans and Mexicans. BY CARINA L. JOHNSON. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 340 pp. \$99.00 (cloth).

Carina Johnson's new book analyzes how the transformation of cultural outlooks during the Protestant Reformation and Counter-Reformation changed Europeans' understandings of Ottoman Turks and Mexicans. In the early sixteenth century, ideas of European superiority were not "fixed." Europeans viewed differences they ascribed to Ottoman Turks and Mexican Indians as fitting within an acceptable range of diversity manifested by human communities. As the Reformations unfolded in the sixteenth century, however, Europeans created a regime of exclusion based on restricted notions of pure faith and European identity. Both Protestants and Catholics, waging

battles over the boundaries of true religion and seeking purity and standardization of belief and practice, devalued Turkish and Mexican identity and religion, often labeling both their material culture and their beliefs as “idolatrous.” Johnson locates the subject of her study in the Habsburg realm, which, in the sixteenth century, united parts of central, northern, and southern Europe in at times closer and other times looser union, and whose span reached to the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire and Central and South America. Ties between members of the Habsburg dynasty enabled courtiers and officials, as well as information and artifacts, to circulate from Mexico to Vienna. Europeans distant from the frontlines of military and cultural encounters still grappled with the meeting of different peoples and their customs and beliefs.

Six chapters arranged into two parts, “Categories of Inclusion” and “Experiments of Exclusion,” constitute Johnson’s book. Despite the division, each chapter begins by addressing cultural forms that were initially inclusive and continues by discussing how these forms devolved into exclusion as Reformation forces reshaped cultural values. Johnson begins by examining fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century cosmographies and ethnographies that describe other communities through relatively neutral categories of geography, social organization, and economic production. Ethnographers examined religion more as practice, which in many cases was analogized with Christian customs, rather than spotlighting differences in belief as intrinsically heretical. The resurgent concept of universal monarchy, moreover, made the case that a Christian emperor could rule over Jewish, Muslim, and pagan peoples. Indeed, Emperor Charles V supported the Hafsid dynasty’s struggle against Ottomans for control of Tunis, and he hosted both Hafsid princes and Mexica notables, who received titles of nobility, stipends, and ceremonial offices, at his court. Aztec and later Inca treasures of precious metals and stones as well as artistically fashioned ornaments were shipped to court. Considered as the tribute of conquered territories, they were incorporated into the Habsburgs’ sacral treasure, which included Christian relics and regalia that served as symbols of imperial sovereignty and legitimacy.

Johnson opens part 2 by returning to ethnographies that, by the mid sixteenth century, distinguish between Christians observing the pure faith and a host of non-European Christians and non-Christians including Ethiopians, Jews, Muslims, and Indians. Conflated together, these latter peoples were oftentimes considered to practice odious customs influenced by the devil. The three chapters of this section then focus more closely on German perceptions of “the Turk,” shaped

by the Ottoman Empire's expansion into central Europe in the mid 1520s. On this volatile frontier, Christians and Muslims raided each other's territories and took captives. Protestant pamphleteers, many of whom had once looked upon icon-adverse Turks as the scourge of unreformed Christianity, reported the suffering of Christian captives and claimed that they were subject to a variety of physical and sexual abuses at the hands of their immoral captors. Printed accounts of an Ottoman diplomatic mission to the election of Emperor Ferdinand's son Maximilian as king of the Romans in 1562 further set Ottomans apart as the ambassador was recognized to be a Polish renegade; the gifts he brought suggested the exotic, and his presence at a stage of the Holy Roman Empire's orderly succession process brought to mind the fratricide, parricide, and even filicide that at times played roles in Ottoman dynastic succession. The book ends by returning to the subject of royal collections that transformed from sacral to encyclopedic over the course of the century. Mexican and Peruvian objects had once been recognized as legitimate symbols of royalty and incorporated into sacral treasure. By the late sixteenth century, they had either been purged from royal collections or were relegated to a geoculturally undifferentiated idolatrous "other" that carried the label "Moorish." Creating a dividing line between pure faith and heresy based on iconography, Protestants forced Catholics at the Council of Trent to both defend their use of images and objects and to articulate a difference from others who used objects. By the end of Johnson's study, Europeans had drawn sharp lines of cultural difference between themselves and non-Europeans and non-Christians.

Johnson's book is ambitious in scope and imaginative in conceptualization. Her research has uncovered an impressive array of archival and printed materials as well as visual and material evidence in numerous institutions in Austria, Germany, and Spain. Her survey of secondary sources spans the historiographies of central Europe, Iberia, colonial Latin America, and the Mediterranean, though her perusal of literature is heavily oriented towards Germany. A more up-to-date consideration of works on the Ibero-Habsburg world, including Kenneth Mills on idolatry in the Andes and Beatriz Alonso Acero on Spain's North African clients, would add more grounding. The book weaves together narrative and evidence in consistently engrossing ways. However, concentrating the development of arguments in key passages of the book, including the introduction and at the beginning of each chapter, would help readers follow the intricate subjects she covers. Chapter titles could also be more precise in describing their contents. For example, chapter 2's title, "Iberia after Convivencia?," would lead a reader to

expect a discussion of how Spain's Muslim and Jewish past may have affected Spaniards' encounter with non-Christians in the New World, though the aftermath of *convivencia* is never actually broached. Ultimately, Johnson's book admirably spans the boundaries that divide different fields of historical study in order to better understand multivalent, rather than binary, experiences of cultural encounter at the confluence of pivotal developments in the sixteenth century.

YUEN-GEN LIANG
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Crime and Punishment in Istanbul: 1700–1800. By FARIBA ZARINEBAF. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010. 304 pp. \$55.00 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper and e-book).

The Ottoman eighteenth century is no longer the neglected “dustbin of history” it was once considered to be. It is notable that Fariba Zarinebaf is able to tell her story of the capital city in a time of tumult without many preliminaries or apologies, thanks to the growing secondary literature on the period and her focus on the center of the empire. The Tulip Age lies at the chronological center of the book. This period of extravagant consumption in Istanbul (funded by borrowing from future provincial revenues) was bookended by major upheavals in 1703 and 1730. In the opening section, Zarinebaf vividly describes the difficulties and dangers of the era: its displaced and mobile populations, its tumult due to disaster and disease, its wars and uncertainties. All of this sometimes led to crime, the topic of the middle section of the book. Crime, in turn, sometimes led to punishment, which is the topic of the book's third section.

Zarinebaf draws on a wide-ranging pool of records. In addition to chronicles, travelers' accounts, and other literary sources, she works with a range of materials from the Ottoman archives, notably Islamic court registers (for Galata and Istanbul from 1720 to 1735), prison and galley registers, police reports, and imperial orders. These sources carry her many decades past the 1730s; while their diverse content and chronological range enrich her story, they also spread it thin. The abundance of detail in this book obscures its narrative goals and their accomplishment. Along the way, many shiny beads are picked up, scrutinized briefly, then disappear, never to reemerge. None of this surfeit of information (the diversity of Istanbul's districts [chapter 1], the threat posed by poor, single, migrant men [chapter 2]) is uninteresting,

but the data often comes in unrelated packets. In chapter 3, Zarinebaf offers a satisfying summary of the Patrona Halil rebellion of 1730, an episode that has received surprisingly little English-language scholarly attention in recent decades. Although Patrona Halil is described as an urban gang member, the chapter is never tightly enough linked to the book's overall contentions (themselves obscure). A subsequent discussion of janissary and gang violence (pp. 119–121), for example, seems an ideal spot to recall the similar themes developed in the Patrona Halil chapter.

The second section of the book wrestles mightily with the diversity of its content. Zarinebaf chooses to organize it using familiar, modern-day, Western categories: "crime," "property," "vice," "violence." In so doing, she highlights her effort to provide rich material for comparison with other settings. At times, the anachronism of this structure is obvious, and the categories she employs sometimes bend the Ottoman story so far as to diminish its usefulness for world historical comparison. "Interfaith sex" (p. 92), for example, is a concept weighted with baggage not wanted on the voyage, and it does almost nothing to explain eighteenth-century Istanbul on its own terms. Much of chapter 5, "Prostitution and the Vice Trade," treats activity that was regulated but not criminalized in eighteenth-century Istanbul. At other times, Zarinebaf uses concepts that offer a better perch for comparative study of world historical phenomena. For example, the circumstantial distinctions between types of theft that she details are intriguing: theft of perishables was treated less severely, theft during fires was treated more severely. But what is the right point of comparison? Types of crimes? Statistics? Institutions? Motives? Unfortunately, Zarinebaf does not give categories the sort of critical attention that might resituate Western models in light of Istanbul's experience.

This point becomes more striking when we consider the comparison of Istanbul to Paris and London, which appears to be a central purpose of the book. While Istanbul's characteristics are clearly articulated, those of the European referent cities are not. The characters of Paris and London are treated as assumed knowledge when they should not be; many Ottomanist readers of the book may be less familiar with European urban history. Even Europeanists reading the book (who would certainly benefit from its content, and its summary of general Ottoman history) will be curious to know Zarinebaf's specific points of comparison. Ultimately, however, it seems that reference to Paris and London is mostly about signaling the historiographical relevance of Istanbul. Surely this manner of justification is no longer necessary.

The third section of the book focuses on punishment. Zarinebaf depicts a system in which neighbors, rather than the state, played the leading role. She outlines general principles of social control, which she illustrates with specific cases, showing the interests of each party. Her archivally grounded description of the *kefil* (moral guarantor) is particularly engaging. In general, it was the same person—a neighbor—who would arrest a criminal and guarantee their rehabilitation. This dual role recalls the dualism of the hero/bandit Patrona Halil, a parallel that invites elaboration. But once again, the comparative potential of the work is underexplored. This is particularly true of chapter 8 (“Ottoman Justice in Multiple Legal Systems”), which does not accomplish much beyond signaling comparison, especially by reference to (a dated) Max Weber.

If there is no obvious answer to the problem of categories in comparative historical analysis, the same is not true of statistics. Clearly, Zarinebaf does not aim at quantification methodology; her book relies on synthesis with a few illustrative stories. But she makes extensive use of statistics that others historians provide (p. 94). Why does she not contribute more of her own? The best effort she makes to provide statistics that could be compared comes in the footnotes (p. 113). Elsewhere, she does not specify numbers that emerge from her unique archival research, even where this would be possible (e.g., pp. 166, 175). Statistics may not be a perfect tool for the world historical comparisons Zarinebaf supports, but they are certainly a useful start. There may be a perfectly good reason for the lack of statistics, but she does not give it. Incidentally, the description of archival sampling as “random” (p. 208 n. 2, p. 218 n. 6, p. 219 n. 23) can be misleading. Historians should be cautious when claiming the authority that comes with such jargon. The nature of data and archival conditions for early modern historical research make statistically “random” sampling impractical and inadvisable. Far better to explain the particular constraints that lead to sampling and to describe the process followed.

The last full chapter (“Ottoman Punishment: From Oars to Prison”) exemplifies the promise and shortcomings of the book. It offers a “major argument” that punishment became pecuniary rather than physical and public rather than private over this period. The evidence is of uneven quality. Exemplary punishment, the supposed “before,” is described only through secondary sources, and Zarinebaf offers only a single example of “False Witnesses, Torture, and False Confessions.” The section titled “Blood Money and Fines” offers a massive survey of fines as defined in code law, but only one bit of primary case evidence. At this point, however, the quality of evidence

shifts markedly. Zarinebaf provides ample examples of galley servitude, banishment, imprisonment, and rehabilitation, painting a fascinating and nuanced picture of the particular regime of punishment in force in Istanbul in the later eighteenth century. In that regime, punishment distinguished between types of “criminals”: galleys for converts and thieves, banishment for women and high officials, imprisonment as a stopgap. Here, Zarinebaf displays the most novel research findings drawn from her archival records, which concern prostitution and galley convicts from the early eighteenth century. It is a tantalizing close to a book that does not deliver all that it promises. Its finest moments take place at the level of the urban quarter: semi-legal flea markets fencing stolen goods (p. 84), the “zoning” of prostitution (p. 104), local efforts at surveillance and control (pp. 130–132). In the flourishing global historiography on urban crime and punishment, this book shows that generalizing from microhistory retains its methodological and narrative challenge.

The book contains a number of editing errors. Septimius Severus built the hippodrome in 203, not Setemius in 1203 (p. 23). Within a single paragraph, the Ottoman word *bostancı* is spelled correctly and incorrectly (p. 138). The endnotes and references are inconsistent and sometimes particularly tangled (pp. 191–192 nn. 24, 34).

WILL HANLEY

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The Mongol Conquests in World History. By TIMOTHY MAY.
London: Reaktion Books, 2012. 320 pp. \$45.00 (cloth).

This work is part of the Globalities series, which investigates big ideas, big changes, and big events in the context of the big picture. The Mongols are therefore natural for inclusion, and May has used them to write a synthetic work designed for a general audience. Thus although he does refer to some academic controversies and occasionally offers his own scholarly opinions, his overarching aim is to give a broad picture of Mongol activities and their extraordinary impact on practically everyone. This he does very well.

The book is divided into two main sections. In the first, May narrates the rise of Chinggis Khan (d. 1227), the course of the Mongol conquests, and the establishment of the Great Mongol Empire. He then follows that empire through its dissolution in the 1260s, down to the politically fractured history of the subsequent Mongol-influ-

enced states. This section is clear and easy to read, which is no mean feat considering the convolutions of the historical material. May has therefore done a real service to general readers interested in Chinggis Khan.

In the second section, May models a theory of the “Chinggis Exchange” on Alfred Crosby’s 1972 concept of the Columbian Exchange, which explained the way Columbus’s discovery of the Americas led to the transmission of biological matter between continents, which in turn transformed politics, economics, and society. Although the comparison is compelling and the theoretical potential of a Chinggis Exchange significant, May does not fully elaborate this idea, even though it would have strengthened the second half of the book. Nevertheless, the material within these chapters reflects his conviction of the Mongols’ worldwide importance and does suggest the possibilities that the concept of a Chinggis Exchange could provide.

Chapter 4 (“Pax Mongolica and Trade”) provides a useful general survey of policy, routes, and developments in trade under Chinggis Khan and his son Ögedei (r. 1229–1241) and in the post-empire khanates. To highlight the global impact of the Mongols, May draws “international” connections, like noting that a London fish market collapsed after Russian merchants stayed home to prepare for Mongol invaders and reminding us that Columbus stumbled across the Americas while seeking the Grand Khan.

In chapter 5 (“New Forms of Warfare”), May analyzes the Mongols’ impact on warfare, especially during the Crusades, and in Eastern Europe and Russia, China, Japan, and the Muslim Middle East. He compares the roles of gunpowder versus naphtha weapons in the pre-modern era, and ends with Chinggis Khan’s influence on twentieth-century warfare in Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Israel. This chapter is particularly strong and reflects May’s well-known expertise in all realms of Chinggis Khan’s military.

Chapter 6 (“The Mongol Administration”) tackles a topic that May acknowledges is both huge and little studied, but it achieves only mixed results. Although it does provide a nuts-and-bolts description of administration and administrative terminology in and after the empire, ranging even to the Crimean Tatars and Temür, some trends in Mongol administration (like the financial reforms of the 1230s) could have used elaboration, and questions of impact are (perhaps of necessity) left unanswered.

May opens chapter 7 (“Religion and the Mongols”) by asking why the Mongols did not immediately convert to a world religion, then hypothesizes about the reasons that Christianity made only modest

inroads on the Mongols while Islam and Buddhism eventually spread among them. Although an interesting point of departure, much of this chapter is speculative, and this reviewer would have liked to see these arguments fleshed out in more detail.

Chapter 8 covers the Black Death, which originated in the Mongol Empire and spread because of the empire's robust trade, a fact known by Mongol specialists but not by many others. May spends this brief but gripping section detailing the rise of the plague and its enormous impact on Europe, the Middle East, and the Mongol khanates, two of which (the Yuan and the Golden Horde) probably collapsed in part because of it.

In chapter 9 ("Migrations and Demographic Trends") May catalogues the movements of different groups across Eurasia. Although some of the activity he traces was a result of the well-known Mongol habit of relocating useful people, May also addresses such important demographic questions as the population in Mongolia, the size of the Mongol armies, the movements of ethnic groups in China during and after the Mongol period, and rates of Turkicization among the Jochids and the Ilkhanids.

In chapter 10 ("Cultural Exchanges"), May notes that this is a huge subject and therefore limits himself to a few examples of cultural transformation in the arts, medicine, food, and clothing, which he follows down to the Safavids and the Ottomans. But although the arguments May raises are interesting, the concise format means that he cannot take the space to prove them. He also ends this chapter abruptly, and the book lacks a conclusion.

Because of the specific "big picture" framework of the Globalities series, May's approach to his material is broad, wide-ranging, often speculative, and very ambitious. At times the results are mixed, but this is unavoidable given the extraordinary scope of what he is trying to do. Nevertheless, in many places his ideas and synthesis are interesting and thought-provoking. General readers will have a lot to mull over, and specialists will be stunned at the range of material May fearlessly took upon himself.

Furthermore, May has spent years in the classroom honing his talent for making this challenging material interesting to people who know nothing about it. To give only one example, in one place he lists twenty-one states that disappeared as a result of the Mongol invasions. The simple weight of name after name drives home the devastation of Mongol expansion better than any statement. He also leaves no technical term unexplained; no group, person, or place unidentified; no theme ignored. In addition he includes the picturesque, gruesome, or

even funny details that undergraduates will remember and discuss at parties; he even brings in humor. His scope, ambition, and many of his results deserve to be commended.

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Crude Reality: Petroleum in World History. By BRIAN C. BLACK.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012. 288 pp.
\$35.00 (cloth); \$34.99 (e-book).

Oil, Brian Black argues, is a “terribly irrational resource” (p. 67). Since humans first began to take a serious interest in the black goo in the late nineteenth century, it has always been a refractory player in the attempts of both governments and corporations to rationalize, systematize, and regularize its extraction and distribution. The complex fluid geology of oil deposits, its immense stored chemical energy, and the astonishing mutability of its long hydrocarbon molecule chains have made it a top troublemaker among global resources. Yet as Black notes in this useful synthetic history, few if any other natural resources have been so central to shaping modern global culture.

Of course, Black is hardly the first to point this out, and he makes effective use of standard works like Daniel Yergin’s masterful volume *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). But *Crude Reality* stands out from this and many other oil books for Black’s skillful incorporation of environmental and cultural history into the more standard narratives focusing on the geopolitics of state and corporate development of global oil resources. Perhaps responding to the influence of recent thinking in science, environment, and technology studies inspired by Bruno Latour and others, Black also makes an important and highly original (albeit somewhat uneven) contribution by analyzing oil itself as a “critical actor, capable of shaping an entire way of life” (p. 1).

Black divides the book into four roughly chronological sections. In “Part I: Cultural Exchange, 1750–1890” he focuses on the difficult challenges faced by early oil pioneers like the Rockefellers, Nobels, and Rothschilds in trying to streamline and control oil extraction and processing. Some, like Rockefeller, effectively ceded the unpredictable business of finding and drilling the vast American oil deposits to others, focusing instead on the more easily rationalized process of refining the black stuff into useful products like kerosene. However, for

European nations without huge domestic reserves, efforts to rationalize the oil business quickly bred incestuous partnerships between governments and corporations as they attempted to dominate distant oil supplies. The result was "Big Oil," quasi-governmental corporations that combined technical know-how with diplomatic—and when necessary, military—power. Big Oil was both a rational and a means for expanding European colonialism in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, and it "emerged as an entity larger than nations and with a mandate to acquire crude regardless of any social or environmental costs" (p. 71). Big Oil succeeded in creating a reliable supply of oil for Great Britain and other industrialized nations, Black notes, but it did so at the price of huge oil spills and contaminated water supplies in the nations where the oil was actually extracted and refined.

Indeed, "Part II: Going Mobile, 1890–1960," suggests that Big Oil had succeeded all too well in increasing production. By the early twentieth century, abundant oil supplies paired with the shift from kerosene to electric illumination drove oil prices sharply down. Desperate to find new uses, oil producers saw their salvation in the internal combustion engine. In the early decades of the twentieth century, oil-powered automobiles competed with mass transit systems supplied by electricity generated primarily by coal or waterpower. The victory of gasoline and private cars was, Black argues, in part a result of the advantages conferred by cheap oil, thus firmly connecting the hugely popular culture of mass automobility to the maintenance of cheap global oil supplies. At the same time, the two world wars demonstrated that oil had become a military necessity. In World War I, a typical American division used 4,000 horsepower; by World War II, the energy use had increased to 187,000, much of it supplied by oil.

Black expands on the cultural and geopolitical consequences of cheap oil in "Part III: The Globalization of Petroleum Domination, 1960–Present." Besides making private automobility affordable, cheap oil raised the standard of living (at least by one measure) of millions by providing them with inexpensive plastics and food. By 1976, the volume of plastic manufactured was greater than that of steel, copper, and aluminum combined. The so-called Green Revolution in global agriculture vastly increased food production through the use of both oil-powered machinery and oil-derived chemicals. Food that had previously been largely the product of solar energy now became the product of oil; in a very real sense, humans began eating the energy of oil rather than that of the sun. It can scarcely come as any real surprise, then, that the United States and many other industrialized nations found themselves embroiled in a long series of "resource wars," of which,

Black argues, the first and second Gulf Wars were only the most recent chapters.

In a concluding section, "Living with Limits and Energy Transition: 1890–Present," Black turns to the complex issue of "peak oil," suggesting that nations like the United States that have failed to take aggressive steps to diminish oil use seem destined to become embroiled in "more and more aggressive wars and conflict regarding oil supplies" (p. 232). However, oil still appears to have some surprises in store. I wonder, for example, what Black would make of the recent prediction by the International Energy Agency that, thanks to new technologies that have opened up large domestic oil deposits like those in North Dakota, the United States will surpass Saudi Arabia as the world's biggest oil producer by 2020?

Regardless of precisely how much oil may be left, though, Black's insightful book demonstrates that other "crude realities" like environmental damage and global warming will likely favor those nations that move beyond oil and pioneer the cleaner alternative energy technologies of the future. In this sense, nations that simply find clever new ways to extend their dependency on this most "irrational" and troublesome of natural resources may, in the long run, prove to be the real losers.

TIMOTHY JAMES LECAIN
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The Colonial Machine: French Science and Overseas Expansion in the Old Regime. By JAMES E. MCCLELLAN III and FRANÇOIS REGOURD. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2011. 696 pp. \$102.00 (cloth).

In the same years that world history emerged as a field, the history of science took what Londa Schiebinger has termed a "colonial turn," exploring the relationship between science and the growth of European empires.¹ *The Colonial Machine: French Science and Overseas Expansion in the Old Regime*, by James E. McClelland III and François Regourd, makes a major contribution to this literature by detailing the exact mechanisms through which science and European colonial expansion worked together, reinforcing and aiding one another,

¹ Londa Schiebinger, "Forum Introduction: The European Colonial Science Complex," *ISIS* 96, no. 1 (2005): 52.

in the eighteenth-century French Empire. McClelland and Regourd argue that France “represents the perfect case” (p. 481) for examining the interactions between science and colonialism in this period because it was a leading, if not *the* leading, European colonial power in the eighteenth century and because of its “institutionalized and state-subsidized” science (p. 14). More than other contemporary European powers, France represented the “marriage” of political power and state authority with the “intellectual and moral authority of science and natural philosophy” (p. 13).

The authors have dubbed the individuals and institutions that created this partnership “the Colonial Machine,” which they define as “a coordinated whole of organized and institutionalized French science and medicine [. . .] turned toward colonial ends” (p. 15). They caution, however, that the Colonial Machine was never an “abstract entity,” but a “collective unity” that “existed only in action” (p. 21). Not only were science and colonial efforts “deeply intertwined,” as has long been recognized, but also “they depended on one another for their mutual success” (p. 482). The state gained tools to expand and consolidate its reach, while at the same time science and the men who pursued knowledge gained access to a wider world and to careers. The Colonial Machine, however, did not constitute a partnership of equals. The disastrous attempt to found a European settler colony at Kourou in French Guiana, a case in which political authorities refused to follow abundant expert advice, illustrates that political power was always preeminent.

The first section of the book describes the parts of the Colonial Machine and how they functioned together. The sponsoring “bureaucratic core” consisted primarily of divisions of the royal government, notably the Ministry of the Navy. The cogs of the machine, where knowledge and expertise were institutionalized, included the Royal Navy; the royal academies, such as the Académie Royale des Sciences, and more specialized institutions, such as the Jardin du Roi; provincial academies; and even personnel of the Compagnie des Indes and missionaries. These all functioned together through overlapping membership, collective projects, and bureaucratic interconnections. In the second part of the book, the authors trace the Colonial Machine in action and the successes it achieved in three areas: conquering space, combating disease, and transferring plants around the globe. Through cartography, better navigation techniques, and advances in sailing and shipbuilding, France and French scientists gained “unparalleled access to the world abroad” (p. 243). The desire to fight disease and to promote better health among sailors, the enslaved, and colonists

encouraged efforts to find solutions to medical problems. Finally, in what was probably its “major sphere of action” (p. 303), the Colonial Machine built an “unprecedented set of botanical infrastructures” that allowed the “reshuffling of plants and animals” throughout the French Empire and beyond (p. 483). The Colonial Machine was far from universally successful, however, and the final section of the book concentrates on the factors such as disease, shipwreck, time, distance, insects, war, bureaucratic egos and infighting, and tensions between central and local authority that limited what the Colonial Machine could accomplish.

Most of these themes have appeared in earlier works by McClellan and Regourd, but are presented here with an unprecedented breadth of example and depth of detail.² The coauthors have conducted extensive exploration in municipal, communal, departmental, and national archives in France as well as in the reports and archives of various academies on both sides of the Atlantic. The printed primary sources consulted alone fill twenty pages of bibliography. From this formidable amount of research, McClellan and Regourd have uncovered and followed the careers of hundreds of the individuals who composed and linked the institutions of the Colonial Machine. They have managed to unravel complex interactions and to expose the creaking wheels and cogs of the “machine” in action as it linked colonies and outposts from Asia, the Indian Ocean, Africa, and the Americas and included voyages of discovery on the world’s oceans and into remote areas such as the Andes and Lapland. Though the detail and examples can sometimes seem overwhelming, readers of this history are often rewarded with interesting, amusing, and striking occurrences and anecdotes. As the authors point out, the story of the Colonial Machine is “full of surprises” (p. 21).

The interdependence of science and colonialism embodied in the Colonial Machine has important historiographical implications, as McClellan and Regourd themselves point out. Just as the two were mutually reinforcing, study of them can be mutually enriching. Since the colonies and the world overseas were not “peripheral” but “formed a constituent element of early modern French science” (p. 484), an understanding of the Colonial Machine is crucial to the story of Old

² See especially John E. McClellan III, *Colonialism and Science: Saint-Domingue in the Old Regime* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), and John E. McClellan III and François Regourd, “The Colonial Machine: French Science and Colonization in the Ancien Régime,” *Osiris*, 2nd ser., 15 (2000): 31–50.

Regime French, and by extension European, science in general. In the same way, French colonial history cannot be fully grasped without an examination of colonial science and of the Colonial Machine.

Scholars in the field of colonial science have recently begun producing numerous comparative works, and *The Colonial Machine* should serve as a useful point of comparison with other contemporary empires. The book also constitutes a “map” to guide historians as they further investigate and refine the “French case” (p. 486). The inclusion of an extensive biographical appendix containing information about the men who composed the Colonial Machine will be extremely valuable for both French colonial historians and historians of French science as they embark on the latter task.

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Empire in Question: Reading, Writing, and Teaching British Imperialism. By ANTOINETTE BURTON. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011. 416 pp. \$94.95 (cloth); \$25.95 (paper).

Antoinette Burton's latest volume, *Empire in Question: Reading, Writing, and Teaching British Imperialism*, is, in part, a mid-career reflection on her evolution as a scholar and teacher. The collection, in a way Burton's academic “autobiography,” also serves as an important retrospective of new imperial history's development into a vital approach to British historical studies. While both Burton and the field have solidified their places in contemporary historiography over the past two decades, this anthology of her most important essays reminds scholars of British imperial studies, postcolonial studies, and gender studies that such has not always been the case. The work of new imperial historians like Burton, alongside Catherine Hall, Ann Stoler, and Tony Ballantyne, has faced challenges from empiricists eager to maintain a divide between the metropole and the “periphery,” and between the historian and his or her work (p. 7). What Burton does in this volume is show how historians' experiences are central to the questions they ask and the critiques they offer. And not taking for granted that new imperial historians have achieved their aims of decentering the metropole, Burton reminds us that there is still much work to do if we are to critique “the certainty of the nation as an analytical category, as a cherished idea, and as a guarantor of the sovereign Western self as well” (p. 3).

This collection of essays is divided into two sections: new imperial historical theory and practice. Part 1, "Home and Away: Mapping Imperial Cultures," revisits the debates surrounding concepts of the nation and the "periphery." Just as *Downton Abbey* thrusts a nostalgic, seemingly empire-free Britain onto the television screens of Britons and Americans, reinforcing ideas of a homogenous island nation, Burton's essays reveal the ongoing academic challenges to new imperial history as scholars of British history have lamented waning institutional focus on Britain. Burton demonstrates that Britain is alive and quite strong, both popularly and academically, but it remains too easy to sidestep the foundational role empire played in developing notions of Britain and Britishness. The essays included in this section, which focus on the utility and persistence of concepts of "nation" and "Britain," reveal that while scholars of new imperial studies have made significant progress in analyzing networks of Britishness, there still remains a longing for, and popular celebration of, an archaic, aristocratic Britain.

In part 2, "Theory into Practice: Doing Critical Imperial History," Burton's essays remind us just how much the methodologies of new imperial history have enriched scholarly understandings of the often false distinctions between imperial and metropolitan identities. The essays included in this section of the book demonstrate the interconnectivity of imperial and domestic debates and show how the imperial "periphery" significantly shaped debates about race, gender, and identity in the metropole. For instance, in Burton's examination of the London School of Medicine for Women she establishes how debates about the role of British women doctors in India reveal "how [metropolitan] gender categories were reconstituted by imperialism even as they helped to determine how the very concept of empire performed the kinds of ideological work it was capable of later in the nineteenth century" (p. 153). Using debates surrounding women's emancipation, women's virtue, and Victorian discourses of democracy in Britain, Burton shows the mutually constitutive ideological work of imperialism.

In the end, this volume asks scholars and students to consider what's next for new imperial studies and British history. As global systems take center stage in historiography, Burton evaluates in an original essay the potential impact of a global approach to British imperial history, positing that "the global would . . . appear to represent a new horizon of possibility, the last frontier, perhaps even the highest stage of imperial history—one that makes doing British empire studies feel respectable, politically relevant, and even redemptive" (p. 276). But

this development in the historiography threatens to repeat past trends and risks reinforcing a British hegemony that excludes consideration of outside influences on the state of the British Empire. Burton suggests that considering the British Empire from a global historical perspective should “not mean conceding the floor, as it were, to British imperialism as static, fully accomplished, or (worse yet) teleologically hegemonic phenomenon untouched by the threat of competitors or the specter of native resistance from within” (p. 279). Rather, she rightly hypothesizes that decentering Britain in global history, as in British imperial history, “requires a leap of imagination and methodological reorientation of the kind that few historians of empire have begun to imagine” (p. 287). If the historiography is to move past a portrayal of global systems with a British center and recognize that the British Empire itself was a “co-authored enterprise,” historians will have to embrace broader methodological approaches to truly get us there (p. 290).

This collection is an invaluable resource for teachers and students of new imperial history. To be able to see the historiographical debate laid bare in such a way, and to read imperial history as Burton masterfully analyzes it, reminds scholars of the continued challenge of displacing popular and academic portrayals of Britain as the isolated, but centrally positioned, “island nation.” As C. A. Bayley attests in his afterword, “a sensibility of *l’angleterre profonde* that is both a powerful myth in history and a set of historical theories in its own right” continues to influence strongly the divide between British domestic and British imperial histories (p. 299). Burton’s evaluation of the field sets forth an important charge for scholars and students alike to continue to push the British empire from the status of exceptional and as a point of origin for global systems to that of a significant contributor to the shared production of those systems (p. 292). Brought together as it is in this volume, Burton’s work demonstrates the challenges, but more so the vital importance, of continuing to push ourselves and British studies past these historiographical barriers to a fuller view of the multiplicity of peoples and places that shape historical and contemporary global systems.

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Multiple Modernities: A Tale of Scandinavian Experiences.

By GUNNAR SKIRBEKK. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011. 232 pp. \$45.00 (cloth).

This book is an excellent historical review and theoretical discussion of the recent historical origins of what we may call Norwegian “model modernity.” And yet, strangely, one aspect that is not discussed is the implications for Norwegian modernization of the location of Norway, at the northern periphery of Europe. Let me come back to this issue in a moment. First, I must note the clear and forceful exposition and the highly interesting discussions in the book, which is a penetrating view of how the well-ordered, uncorrupt, rational, relatively egalitarian twentieth-century societies on the northern fringes of Europe came to be. It will surely appeal to all scholars interested in the plurality of modernity. Indeed, the publication by the press of the Chinese University of Hong Kong should ensure that it reaches an audience far beyond Scandinavianists and will influence ongoing scholarly debates. Publishing around the globe from Norway is clearly intentional; the author, Skirbekk, is a founder of the Marco Polo program for “comparative studies of cultural modernization in Europe and East Asia” established by the University of Bergen, Norway, and East China Normal University, Shanghai.

Skirbekk rightly points out that the reputation of Scandinavian countries (or, better, Nordic countries, to include Norway’s intimately related neighbors Finland and Iceland, in addition to Sweden and Denmark) as “model” modern countries typically refers to the twentieth century welfare states. But, not as much has been written about their historical roots or the wider theoretical significance. Here, after an overview of the philosophical and sociological study of modernity, the author begins by investigating nineteenth-century Norway. He delves into the role of education and the nineteenth-century “potato priests,” the Enlightenment-inspired Lutheran clergy devoted to the agricultural and other forms of teaching of the common people, and the dynamics of this clergy and the popular movements rising in the same era and transforming and broadening national politics. Skirbekk identifies these developments as a “typical Scandinavian dialectics” of social democracy and modernity (p. 32) and underlines the formative societal and national-political significance of mass self-education and self-training in internally democratic civic organizational life of this era. Chapter 3 discusses how all this unfolded locally, including in the self-enlightening inner life of popular self-educational *samtaleforeninger* (farmers’ “conversation clubs”) in which locals organized debates on

the topics of the day, taking up opposite positions for the sake of mass self-education. (No hint of global-comparative discussion is included here, but one wonders how such a farmer's club might be condemned and suppressed as heretic in more authoritarian societies.)

Skirbekk proceeds to discuss developments up until the Nazi Germany invasion in 1940, focusing on engineers, teachers, and lawyers, but also unions and class issues—everywhere providing rich references to relevant literature. Thus arriving at World War II and the twentieth-century welfare state, Skirbekk then turns the clock back and delves farther back in history, first the eighteenth century, then again all the way to pre-Christian times and the early Norwegian kingdoms. He admirably discusses a wealth of pertinent factors (for example, the introduction of Protestantism, which is often seen as popular and anti-Catholic but in Norway was in fact imposed from the top down). Only in the last chapter does he return to more familiar post-World War II Norway. These bold rhetorical moves are admirably executed in a concise and clear manner, and together result in an original contribution, above all in the book's deeper, richly textured view of Norwegian history as it relates to the broader issues of modernity.

Despite this rich, sophisticated discussion of popular and institutional codevelopments, it seems to me that the book underplays the significance of the geo-cultural location of Norway and how Norwegian elites may have measured themselves against peer European nations. This aspect of competitive mimicry is a dynamic process in which local elites, prompted by the conditions of conceptual integration of a wider region (a process itself interconnected with economic integration), come to understand themselves as part of its identity space and seek to prove themselves against the values that are shared in it. For an illuminating example, consider the spread of the national museums in the Europe to which Norway came to belong: These spread across Europe in the image of powerful early models in France (the Louvre), Britain, and elsewhere, everywhere embodying the effort to copy or outshine such models of prestige and ostentation. Institutions of education, politics, religion and so on inescapably are also part of such a dynamics of mimicry based in a shared identity, and the discussion of Norway's modernity would gain much by delving further into the competitive fantasies of the Church, of Europe, and so on, as well as the context of trade and power relations that bolstered them.

If we consider the case of the Norwegian popular-religious rebellious movement Haugeanism, admirably discussed by Skirbekk in several chapters, a similar expansion of our perspectives might also be productive. This even if accumulative civilizing and modernizing

processes do exist— though these can of course also collapse or even be reversed, when the conditions of their growth cease to exist (as happened frequently in history, with economic-political disintegration, of course there can be a “return to a premodern stage” (p. 170). It seems that here, too, history is necessary, but the structural parameters of the historical production of society and its ideologies are also relevant, on all levels.

Hauge was an ordinary farmer who started an anti-establishment popular movement after a sudden religious vision, in 1796. Though he was later imprisoned by state authorities, his followers were eventually successful in acquiring rights of public assembly not previously permitted by the state and its church, which held Norway (and each of the Nordic countries) in a firm ideological grip. Skirbekk places these developments in the historical context of nineteenth-century public life in Norway, hitherto reserved for the elites, suggesting that this movement exemplifies modernization from below: by insisting on the space also for alternative visions, it created a more complete public sphere. These are important insights. But we may also observe how Haugeanism was a reaction provoked by a structure already imposed, and this rebellious movement was only conceivable and possible in the form it took because of this preexisting structure of individual, nation, and state religion that preceded it. That arrangement is what enabled the conception of an alternative—within the same reinforced identity space. It would not have been born in the way it was were not the stage first set by state-sanctioned priests as agents of royal and state power with the original objective of unifying and concentrating power over all the far-scattered communities under one king, and for that purpose eliminate local beliefs and religious practices that could form a threat to centralized royal power. The significance for the creation of Norway as such, as a singular identity space, may be more important even than the contents of the various tenets of the different Christianities introduced from abroad. There is a dialectical interrelationship between the thinking of a Norwegian rebellion and the structure against which, and within which, the rebellion is conceived. But this aspect is not investigated in this otherwise rich book, it seems to me, because the contexts and dialectics involved in the making of an identity space are not emphasized, and instead modernization is ultimately seen as a generalized movement of rationalization somehow proceeding spontaneously as if it were an unstoppable movement of progress and enlightenment. But in such a framework it becomes harder to understand why some people modernize and some lag behind as relatively unmodern. If instead we emphasize the dialectics of context and identity, however, I

think we might see that the key questions of global solutions and sustainability for the future that are discussed in the book's poignant final chapter also will depend (in addition to rationality) on overcoming the exclusionary and exploitative economic divisions of the world as well as the current selfishness of the "most modern" nations, so as to pave the way for a new form of global human identity.

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Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept.

Edited by MICHAEL BONINE, ABBAS AMANAT, and MICHAEL EZEKIEL GASPER. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011. 344 pp. \$80.00 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper and e-book).

The short answer to this book's leading question is an assertive yes. There is indeed a Middle East. Edited by the late Michael Bonine, a geographer, Abbas Amanat and Michael Ezekiel Gasper, both historians, *Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept* brings together an impressive array of scholars with wide-ranging areas of expertise. Through ten rich chapters (divided into three sections), this book illustrates how the term, the idea, and the framework of the Middle East has been constructed as an abstract geopolitical (and economic) entity over the last several decades. As the editors briefly outline in the preface and introduction, the book follows the evolution of the concept of the Middle East, but also seeks to problematize it and to examine the impacts of its construction.

The first section of this book addresses the multiple ways that the term "Middle East," as well "Near East" and several others terms, have evolved. Tracing its usage in several European languages in nineteenth century, Yilman posits that it was the Eastern Question, or European geopolitics of the weakening Ottoman Empire, from which the Middle East emerged. With great detail, Yilman shows that the Middle East is a Eurocentric construction that emerged from geopolitical discourse. Adelson's chapter furthers Yilman's point by arguing that the term gain widespread acceptance in the United States and the United Kingdom as a geopolitical relic of the post-World War II and Cold War eras. In the third chapter, Bonine adds a geographical analysis by summarizing the fluctuations of geographical delineations of the Middle East in world-regional geography textbooks, atlases, and maps. In the final chapter of this section, Rouighi provides an in depth study of how dif-

ferent intuitions within the Maghrib use this Eurocentric concept. He highlights that the concept is not widely adopted, but when it is used, it generally refers to somewhere east of the Maghrib.

With the premise of the book well established in the first section—that there are incredible variations and ambiguities of this term, of its Eurocentric origins, and the lack of internal adoption—the second section provides depth and detail on various constructions of the Middle East. Khazeni's chapter looks at the inclusion and exclusion of Central Asia as part of Middle East showing how boundaries became fixed on maps only in nineteenth century amid the great imperial rivalries of Britain, Russia, and Persia. Sood examines vernacular geographies in the eighteenth century through the writings of merchants working and living around the Arabian Sea. His rich discussion shows that geography was relative; there were no clear boundaries, frontiers, or states. In the third chapter of this section, Varisco considers how the Holy Land, as a geographical precursor to the Middle East, was perceived by pilgrims. Varisco stresses, in contradiction to Edward Said, that this region was idealized as a utopia and hence not inferior to Europe. The last chapter of this section draws on environmental history to debunk myths that Arabs mishandled and degraded the land. In her analysis, Davis provides an impressive and much-needed critique of some foundational stereotypes of the Middle East, whilst critiquing the colonist narrative that was used to justify their control of the "fragile" land and people.

The third section of this book then moves on to examine the contemporary Middle East from a global perspective. Gelvin provides a political economic history of the region, underscoring the global connections of the economic order. Hazbun's chapter similarly examines global connections but through a critical geopolitical lens. His chapter is a sustained discussion that addresses how the discourse of Middle East "exceptionalism" (that the Middle East is inherently different from the West) has framed public and official understandings of post-9/11 geopolitics and justified American foreign policies in the region.

The eclecticism of perspectives and foci presented in this book make for a valuable contribution to any aspect of Middle East studies. Even with the diverse chapters, this edited collection clearly and superbly demonstrates the construction of the Middle East as an abstraction, highlighting its Eurocentric origins and lack of acceptance from within. Though this book has many great contributions, there are of course some ways the book could have been strengthened.

First, a more sustained critical perspective could have helped one of the book's main goals of problematizing the Middle East. Not

only does the book reify and support the continued usage of the term Middle East (see chapter 3 specifically), but the at times some of the all too familiar stereotypes of the Middle East (i.e., as a place of political extremism, resentments, and oil, and as lacking agency to change) are recycled (see the introductory chapter specifically). Both Bonine and Adelson make a cautionary statement about conflating and homogenizing such a vast area, but a more sustained critique is warranted. It is notable that literary scholars and feminist perspectives are absent from this book, and perhaps such contributions might have added a more critical perspective. Another area that could have been developed is an analysis of the impacts or effects of the use and evolution of the concept today. Though Hazbun does examine the effects of discourses today, and there are inklings of such points scattered elsewhere, the book misses the chance to probe into the ways in which the general public imagines this place, as well as how foreign policies are implemented today. A smaller concern is the lack of editorial discussion. Editorial introductions to each section were absent. These would have been immensely useful for weaving together some main arguments and similar themes between the chapters.

Noting these few concerns, any professional or advanced student who focuses on the Middle East should read this book, as it can help to question the “object” of many people’s studies and curiosities. Ultimately, what this books highlights is that even though the Middle East has Eurocentric geopolitical origins and that it is a fluid concept, it is a concept that is very meaningful, very much here to stay, and thus very much in need of critique.

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Nationalists Who Feared the Nation: Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and Venice. By DOMINIQUE KIRCHNER REILL. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012. 336 pp. \$65.00 (cloth and e-book).

The lands surrounding the Adriatic Sea have often changed hands, and they have been famous—indeed, often infamous—for the diversity of their population. The dominant groups have been Italian and, to adopt the less-than-nuanced rhetoric of the nineteenth century, Slavic, but the commercial importance of Adriatic ports meant that languages from all over the world could be heard on a daily basis,

too. As Romantic nationalism began to inspire European intellectuals in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, residents of the Adriatic region pondered what those nationalist ideas might mean for their diverse homeland. In addition to this developing nationalism, political control over the Adriatic from Venice to Dubrovnik had shifted to the Habsburgs in 1814, giving the sense that a new era was at hand. Nationalist historians have typically characterized the Adriatic thinkers who emerged in this first generation of Habsburg rule as proponents of nation-states, placing individuals either in the story of the creation of a unified Italy or the development of Yugoslavia or Croatia. In her study of a network of six of these thinkers, however, Reill reminds us that, at least before 1848, they had other ideas about nationalism, too.

Occupying the most important node in the network was Niccolò Tommaseo (1802–1874), a Dalmatian-born writer who spent much of his life in Venice. Like many upwardly mobile residents of the Adriatic region, his primary language of communication was Italian and he initially rejected the language and culture of his Slavic mother. However, after spending some time in exile on the island of Corfu and reading popular Romantic studies of Dalmatian folk songs, he made an effort to renew his connections to the Slavic world. As a result, he developed an understanding of nationalism that Reill has dubbed “Adriatic multinationalism.” Tommaseo argued that separate nations should exist, but they should exist in neither vacuum, nor hierarchy; to develop, nations needed to interact with one another, sharing their best traits and learning from others. It was a nationalism of cooperation and equality, while also recognizing a fundamental difference between nations, and it did not require that each nation have its own separate state. It was also a nationalism that eschewed revolution; having witnessed the trauma of the Napoleonic era, Tommaseo was an advocate of reform and gradual change, rather than abrupt, violent transitions.

Tommaseo’s prolific writings on all manner of subjects earned him a wide following of readers and correspondents, not only in Adriatic communities, but throughout Europe. Reill convincingly argues that the development of steamship service in the Adriatic produced an intellectual network that fostered the development of Tommaseo’s conception of multinationalism. Before the introduction of the steamships, mail service and travel were unpredictable, given their reliance on Adriatic weather, but with the steamship service, not only could there be more frequent post, but individuals could carry correspondences privately—a consideration that helped intellectuals avoid limitations imposed by Habsburg censors. The steamships, first operated by

Lloyd, also led to the development of regional newspapers and periodicals that were sponsored directly by the company. In Trieste, the three major publications were all run by Lloyd, and they were all edited by the partnership of Francesco Dall'Ongaro (1808–1873) and Pacifico Valussi (1813–1893). Both editors became regular correspondents of Tommaseo, and their publications supported Adriatic multinationalism. Their publications also provided a forum for the Dalmatian writers Medo Pucić (1821–1883), Ivan August Kaznačić (1817–1882), and Stipan Ivičević (1801–1871). Pucić and Kaznačić tended toward a more pro-Slavic position, and Ivičević's project was the creation of a universal system of writing that would allow medication despite differences in language. The six authors were in frequent communication and often worked together on joint projects in the ten years before 1848, fostering the elucidation of how multinationalism might work, not only in the Adriatic, but throughout Europe.

Reill argues that the experiences of the six men during the revolutions of 1848 destroyed their network of communication and also pushed them away from Adriatic multinationalism and toward either Italian or Slavic mononationalism. Tommaseo became the minister for religion and education in the short-lived Republic of San Marco (Venice); Dall'Ongaro fought against Habsburg forces and developed a new newspaper that stressed the needs of Italians to destroy "German" Habsburgs and their "Croatian" soldiers (pp. 189–190). Valussi supported Venice, but was saved from exile due to his political connections in Vienna; he later ran for office and had a lengthy political career as an Italian irredentist. Pucić, Kaznačić, and Ivičević stayed in Habsburg-controlled Dalmatia and continued their enthusiasm for multinationalism, although they shifted away from seeing the Adriatic as a tool for cooperative national development. Instead, they celebrated the multinationalism of their immediate localities and developed a greater sense of identity as Dalmatians.

Reill effectively traces the development of this intellectual network and the transmission of ideas through it, as well as the importance of the revolutions of 1848 in breaking it apart. Her account is well written and succinct, and would be appropriate not only for specialists in the field but also for upper-level undergraduates studying the development of nationalist thought. The book highlights an important problem in writing biography: namely, the tendency to view a person's beliefs as constant over their lifetime, or at least in their adulthood. Reill's study clearly demonstrates that people change their minds. In this case, suggesting that these figures were consistent proponents of an Italian or Slavic nationalism throughout their careers

obscures the complexity of their thought before 1848 and makes those mononationalist projects appear stronger and more inevitable than they actually were.

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Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914. By DAVIDE RODOGNO. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011. 376 pp. \$39.50 (cloth and e-book).

Davide Rodogno's *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914* (a part of the *Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice* series) analyzes the confluence between humanitarian intervention and geopolitical rivalries in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The book explores how legal scholars, politicians, and public figures in Europe defined humanitarian intervention with respect to the Ottoman Empire—a state Europeans never considered fully civilized and whose sovereignty was always up for debate even after the Treaty of Paris (1856) briefly admitted the Muslim empire, albeit as inferior, into the Christian Family of Nations.

Against Massacre raises the following question: In what specific historical contexts and geopolitical constellations did the Great Powers decide to intervene on behalf of humanity (i.e., to stop and prevent future massacres of and atrocities against Christian [never Muslim] Ottoman subjects)? Or, alternatively, when did the powers stand on the sidelines despite evidence of gross violations against humanity? Rodogno's cogently argued, meticulously researched, and well-written answer shows that Great Power governments assessed the severity of violence that the Ottoman state perpetrated against its rebellious Christian subjects and crafted responses according to a few major considerations: Europe's collective security; the commercial interests of each power; shifting alliances for "balance of power" among Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Germany; and the success of the broader colonial projects of each power in Asia and Africa. Meanwhile the perceived and real failures of the nineteenth-century Ottoman efforts at sweeping administrative, economic, legal, and military reforms provided the Great Powers with plenty of opportunities to exercise diplomatic pressures on Ottoman governments for betraying their pledge to enforce "good government" (p. 29). Ottoman reformers faced a real

challenge in this respect: how to address long-standing social problems (like the abuses of tax farming, for instance) in a new political framework, one that appeared not to value the balance, hierarchal and imperfect to be sure, among confessional groups but demanded loyalty to the integrity of a modernizing Ottoman state in exchange for individual equality. Frustration with lingering or new problems in this era of reforms often erupted in violence, which the European powers saw as proof of the inherent deficiencies of Ottoman rule. Thus European humanitarian intervention occurred at the interface between Ottoman reforms and Great Power rivalries.

Methodologically Rodogno focuses on Great Britain and France, culling diplomatic documents from the foreign office archives of the two countries and supplementing them with a rich variety of published documents as well as memories, diaries, and the writings of contemporary legal scholars. By delving into the writings of legal scholars as well as political figures in the first two chapters, Rodogno explains how the idea of modern humanitarian intervention was articulated and became so important to “balance-of-power” politics on the European continent as well as to European imperial ambitions in the long nineteenth century. In the remaining chapters of *Against Massacre* Rodogno deftly analyzes specific cases so as to elucidate the logics behind intervention and non-intervention on the grounds of saving strangers from massacre and atrocity.

Rodogno’s argument is especially compelling when he discusses the complex relationship between public opinion and governments’ decisions regarding humanitarian intervention in the Ottoman Empire. Publicly, intervention was usually justified with the brutalization of Christians, as was the case in the Greek Revolt (1821), or thereafter with Ottoman failed reforms resulting in massacres, as was the case in Ottoman Lebanon and Syria (1860) and Crete (1866). Each episode of bloodshed stirred especially British and French public opinion (liberal, conservative, religious), prompting the outburst of publications about Ottoman barbarity and misrule, encouraging relief efforts, and stimulating the formation of domestic and, by the end of the nineteenth century, international associations dedicated to advocating intervention against a particular massacre (Greek Christians in Crete, Slavic Christians in the Balkans, Armenian Christians in eastern Anatolia). Macedonian revolutionaries in particular at the turn of the twentieth century worked up European public opinion by disseminating and amplifying stories of Christian massacres in the hopes of provoking intervention and ultimately gaining independence. Armenian revolutionaries provoked Ottoman retribution for the same reason. Yet Euro-

pean domestic public opinion never managed to force international action even in the well-publicized and gruesome Armenian massacres of 1894–1895 and 1909 unless more pressing geopolitical interests were at stake. Here Rodogno's analysis is quite poignant especially in the context of the appalling humanitarian crisis unfolding in Syria now (2013), which remains unaddressed again due to the rival interests of key global players as well as U.S. caution arising from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The two interventions in Crete discussed in chapter 4 and chapter 9 serve as good examples of this logic.

The multilateral European humanitarian intervention in Ottoman Crete in 1867 followed the suppression of an 1866 Christian revolt that had started with a host of social, economic, and political demands referencing the Reform Edict of 1856, but quickly became an international crisis as Greek and other foreign armed volunteers joined in to save the island from the ostensible Ottoman yoke. European public opinion, especially in France, advocated intervention by invoking the clauses of the Paris Treaty, which obliged the Ottoman government to improve the conditions of Christians. France's position vacillated until the Russians disembarked warships in Crete. Despite evidence of massacres the British government resisted intervention to the last moment, preferring instead to support the Ottoman government lest the other powers intervene and disturb the balance of power in the Mediterranean. In the end, collective action was possible as the only way to limit rival ambitions. The Ottoman government accepted the demand of the powers for further reform, resulting in the 1868 *Règlement*. Almost three decades later, another Cretan revolt provoked European military intervention again. The second intervention in Crete occurred a year after the powers had done nothing to stop and prevent further massacres of Ottoman Armenians in the Adana region. This time around the Greek government did not limit itself to sending volunteers but declared war (1897), intending to annex the island. Total Greek humiliation in the face of resounding Ottoman victories was prevented by the European powers. They forced Greece to accept Cretan autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty, put the island under international occupation, and appointed the Greek king as the high commissioner of Crete. Grecification of the island followed, accompanied by the gradual emigration of the Muslim population, which the powers viewed as the long-term solution to both the humanitarian crisis and the prevention of future conflict. Peace and collective security obtained for Europe as fledgling Ottoman sovereignty, undergirded by almost complete Ottoman financial dependence on Europe (after the establishment of the Public Debt Administration in 1881), suggested that the powers were ill prepared or

unwilling to guarantee peace within religiously and ethnically heterogeneous societies (pp. 222–228). This was the legacy of humanitarian intervention that the nineteenth century bestowed on the post–Cold War world, as Rodogno suggests in his epilogue.

The second intervention in Crete brings to the fore another layer of Rodogno's analysis of humanitarian intervention: Since the late 1870s increased continental and imperial rivalries among the European powers made humanitarian interventions much riskier and more entangled affairs. For example, as Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina was put under Austro-Hungarian administration following the Eastern Crisis (1875–1878), Austro-Russian competition over the Balkans intensified. Consequently collective military involvements on behalf of Ottoman Christians occurred less often; diplomatic pressure in the shape of reform programs, such as the Müzzes Program for Macedonia, became the favored method of engaging the Ottoman Empire. Along with this shift came another “representational,” though materially consequential, change: No longer only the victims of Muslim cruelty, Ottoman (or Eastern as they were sometimes called) Christians were themselves uncivilized and hence their claims could not be fully trusted especially if the powers were reluctant to intervene. The cruelties committed by Macedonian revolutionaries shocked European sensibilities (p. 239) and proved convenient in justifying nonintervention to angry domestic advocates. Buds of this were evident in the first Cretan crisis, when the British government endorsed the statements of diplomats that Christians were also uncivilized and responsible for the bad government of Crete (p. 123). This rhetoric came at a time when the British government had to fend off criticism for the brutal suppression of an insurrection in one of Britain's own colonies (p. 122). Likened to “barbarous” Muslims, the Christian nationalist groups miscalculated that tales of Muslim atrocities would provoke European intervention. Of course European (and, in the nineteenth century, American as well) condescension toward “Eastern Christians” (as well as Jews) for being half civilized goes back to the arrival of merchants and missionaries in the Levant from the late sixteenth century onward whose own material, ideological, and spiritual exigencies underlay the later western “civilizing mission” in the Ottoman Empire.¹

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¹ See Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).

The Russian Origins of the First World War. By SEAN MCMEEKIN.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2011. 344 pp. \$29.95 (cloth).

Russia's role in the Great War has long been overshadowed by accounts that focus on the participation of the Western nations. Sean McMeekin, assistant professor of international relations at Bilkent University in Turkey, admirably seeks to remedy this neglect. In so doing, he not only attempts to demonstrate the importance of Russia in the war but also to assert that it was instrumental in provoking the outbreak of war in 1914 through aggressive imperialist policies. McMeekin argues for a reassessment of Fritz Fischer's thesis of German responsibility for war in light of often overlooked Russian sources. Drawing largely from the Archive of Imperial Russian Foreign Policy and the Russian State Military History Archive, the author insists these sources belie the conventional wisdom that posits the tsarist empire as a reluctant, stumbling participant in the war, and instead reveal a calculated and forceful Russia that had much to gain in major international conflict, in particular, in the crumbling Ottoman Empire. It is through the lens of Russia's policies and actions on its eastern front that he stakes his claim.

The book begins with a detailed analysis of the development of Russian foreign policy, the main focus of which, McMeekin argues, was the securing of the Straits and possession of Constantinople, which drove Russia's *casus belli*. Examining documents left behind by major (and some minor) players in shaping Russia's foreign policy goals, and its preparations for war, he argues these men strongly pushed for war, and were successful in shaping Russian actions, as part of the realization of age-old obsessions of Russian foreign policy: the acquisition of a warm water port, as well as the ancient drive to gain control of "Tsargrad." This, he says, is the central focal point of all of Russia's other international interests—even its willingness to fight a war against Germany and Austro-Hungary in Eastern Europe. McMeekin further argues that the military focus on Polish lands was not only another long-standing desire of tsarist expansion, but that securing this region was necessary to facilitate movement to the southwest to complete the conquest of the Straits and Constantinople. He even goes so far as to say that control of Poland was not central to Russia's war aims, but rather merely a piece of the eastern strategy.

The author attempts to demonstrate that Russia, rather than entering the war reluctantly, only after coming to the conclusion that there was little alternative, was so primed for conflict that it actually began secret mobilization of its forces a full five days before any declaration

of war had been made. He dismisses the conventional wisdom concerning Russia's great fear of being unprepared for and, therefore, less than willing to go to war against what was perceived as a superior enemy (Germany). Echoing Norman Stone's seminal work *The Eastern Front, 1914–1917* (1975), he argues that the Russians were fairly well matched against the Germans, whom they outnumbered in terms of troops in the field and whose technology was roughly on par with their own. The author then details the process by which Russia's ally, Great Britain, unwittingly played into its goals in the Straits, even to the point of providing the major military muscle to achieve them (to the point of suffering terrible losses like those sustained at Gallipoli), despite the fact that little more than a half century before the British had gone to war in the Crimea to prevent this from occurring. The result of this discussion of British actions, however, leaves the reader with the impression that Russia was the passive beneficiary of its ally's changed "Eastern Question" goals, rather than a deliberate puppeteer manipulating the British into acting in step with Russian aims in the Straits. He provides great detail about the campaigns fought against the Ottomans. In fact, despite the stated diplomatic focus of the book, much of the narrative actually centers on the military actions undertaken by the Russian armed forces.

McMeekin does provide some evidence from the diplomatic record that reveal the machinations of some Russian officials (in particular, Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazonov and head of Stavka's diplomatic arm Nikolai Bazili) who clearly wanted to accomplish Russian expansion into the Straits and Constantinople. Yet, he neglects to consider the positions of many in the tsarist administration that held different, more cautious views, including the tsar himself. Moreover, most of the documents he draws upon were produced *after* the conflict had already begun. Taken together, much of his evidence is much less convincing as indications of an aggressive premeditated gamble and more like attempts to take advantage of what now seemed like an opportunity to fulfill long-standing foreign policy goals once the war had begun, provided that Russia had the considerable support of its allies. One might also question the extent to which McMeekin's aim of overturning the Fischer thesis of German aggression as the primary cause of World War I is a unique or even necessary one. Fischer first published his work in 1961, and while it may have held sway over the scholarly community for some time, it certainly has not maintained the authority McMeekin seems to attribute to it now. Over the past decades, scholars have introduced a heavy dose of criticism of Fischer and provided numerous other causation theories, focusing the aims of other nations

as well as on economic, social, and cultural factors. McMeekin's originality lies in his thesis that Russia's aggression assumed primacy in sparking international conflict, but unfortunately, it is not sufficiently proven. Thus, while the book may be useful in sparking debate over Russia's role in the war, it should be measured against other sources, such as Dominic Lieven's *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* (1983) and Michael Reynolds' recent *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires* (2011), to provide a more balanced view.

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Pedagogy for Religion: Missionary Education and the Fashioning of Hindus and Muslims in Bengal. By PARNA SENGUPTA.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. 222 pp.
\$65.00 (cloth); \$29.95 (paper and e-book).

How might a pluralistic society—one historically fractured by tensions across differences of religion, culture, and political privilege—create a modern, unified national identity, while maintaining the integrity of communal religious identity? Both the Bengali Hindu *bhadralok* and the Muslim *ashraf* contemplated this question in the early twentieth century as Indians imagined a postcolonial future. As Parna Sengupta demonstrates in *Pedagogy for Religion: Missionary Education and the Fashioning of Hindus and Muslims in Bengal*, nineteenth-century Indian religious leaders had already begun to explore answers to this question as they lobbied the colonial state on behalf of local vernacular primary education that included religious instruction. Ultimately, Sengupta finds, the efforts of both Hindu and Muslim leaders in Bengal to craft a modern religious subjectivity through education in their communities made it possible “to imagine how separate religious curricula (and religious communities) could be folded into a single school system or nation”—in other words, Indians had already begun to forge a “pedagogy for tolerance” (p. 152) in a plural society.

Pedagogy for Religion challenges the assumption that religion and religious education are “backward-looking” or antimodern, and also counters the common belief that the Western imperial project in India had a primarily secularizing influence. Instead, Parna Sengupta comes to the surprising conclusion that nineteenth century Western Protestant mission schools in Bengal provided a model of education designed

to create a distinctively modern religious subject—a model that was then taken up by both Hindu and Muslim advocates for religious instruction in vernacular schools. As both *bhadralok* and *ashraf* sought to define modern Hindu and Muslim identities in the late nineteenth century, Bengalis “had to learn to possess and inhabit their religiosity in recognizable and acceptable ways” (p. 151). Their adoption of a modern religiosity played a key role, first, in obtaining the funding and support of the colonial government, and, second, in the formation and policing of community identities. Following the example of Western mission schools that privileged written over oral education, emphasized the creation of a moral, “civilized” individual, and embedded specific gender expectations into the curriculum, often with separate teaching for girls and boys, Bengali leaders sought to create vernacular schools that—far from inculcating reactionary loyalty to a static faith—taught Hindu and Muslim children how to behave as modern, “civilized” religious subjects who would themselves function as cultural emissaries, missionaries to their own cultures. Thus “religion and religious identity, rather than secularism,” came to define modern education in Bengal (p. 148).

In *Pedagogy for Religion*, Sengupta, who is associate director of Stanford Introductory Studies at Stanford University, brings together three fields of study that are rarely placed in conversation with one another: the history of Western missions, imperialism, and education. She draws source material from all of these areas, reading English-language colonial government sources, especially the reports and records of the Department of Public Instruction, pedagogical manuals like David Stow’s 1860 *Object Teaching and Oral Lessons*, and mission accounts from the Church Missionary Society, Baptist Missionary Society, and Scottish Free Church mission, among others, alongside the Bengali and English publications of teachers and education reformers like Gopal Chunder Bandhopadhyay and Abdul Karim. The sources range in time from English missionary William Carey’s 1792 *Enquiry into the Obligations of Christians to Use Means for the Conversion of the Heathen*, to the 1942 *Report of the Kamal Yar Jung Education Committee*, a document written by Bengali Muslim leaders in the context of coming Indian independence. The book thus covers a wide swath of Bengal’s colonial history, though Sengupta spends most of her time in the late nineteenth century. Occasionally, the broad scope of the monograph does make its overarching argument less clear. It is difficult to pin down in early chapters exactly what Sengupta understands as constitutive of “modern religious subjectivity”—a list of characteristics of modern religious education does appear in the conclusion—and though she

asserts a direct connection between Protestant missionary understandings of religion as a civilizing, community-making agent and the use of religious education for the making of Hindu and Muslim citizens, the connection is not always fully proven. Sengupta also perhaps unfairly collapses distinctions among Protestant missionary perspectives to create a general picture of mission schools when, for example, the Anglican Church Missionary Society understood the role of native Christian schoolteachers quite differently than Baptist missionaries did. While the CMS may have expected Indian educators to “emulate European patriarchal mores and comportment” while never actually considering them “part of the European family” (p. 90), many BMS missionaries held a radically opposite view, urging native Christians to retain the trappings of their own culture after conversion and accepting intermarriage between European missionaries and Indian Christians (see Brian Stanley, *History of the Baptist Missionary Society*, 1992, and E. Daniel Potts, *British Baptist Missionaries in India*, 1967).

However, Sengupta offers many convincing demonstrations of real cross-pollination between missionary and native pedagogies. One of the most fascinating chapters of the book examines the use of the object lesson in both mission and *bhadra* schools in Bengal. Based on a pedagogic technique pioneered by a Swiss educator, the object lesson taught both evangelical and Hindu students “one of the fundamental tenets of modern (Western) thinking,” the abstraction of ideas from concrete objects (p. 62). Where mission teachers sought to demystify what they saw as the fetishism of Hindu idol worship, Sengupta shows that *bhadralok* educators adopted the object lesson technique as a way to teach science and rationality of approach to all topics, including religion. Pedagogical influences flowed both ways, however; most mission schools, in spite of opposition from their home societies, chose to use a vernacular primer written by Bengali educator Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar instead of teaching from a Bengali Christian reader, because Vidyasagar’s texts were more authentic and pedagogically effective (pp. 40–43). Sengupta also brings to light several groups who appear infrequently in empire or religious histories, or even studies of colonial India: *adivasi* (tribal) students, whom both Western missionaries and Bengali elite struggled to accept as fully “civilized” members of their respective communities, and *Bairagi* women, whose utility as teachers of *bhadra* girls was questioned in the context of shifting gender norms in late nineteenth-century Bengali society.

Pedagogy for Religion will be of interest to scholars of colonial and nationalist India, those interested in the intersections between religion and empire, and students of pedagogical history. Overall, in addition

to the innovative historical argument Sengupta makes, providing new connections between often disparate fields, her monograph also offers a strikingly relevant commentary on contemporary debates about the place of religious education—and in particular Qur'an schools—in modern society, East or West.

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Boll Weevil Blues: Cotton, Myth, and Power in the American South.
By JAMES C. GIESEN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
240 pp. \$40.00 (cloth); \$7.00–\$32.00 (e-book).

Boll Weevil Blues: Cotton, Myth, and Power in the American South by James C. Giesen is about a destructive little insect and its impact on one of the key agricultural regions of the United States: the American South. The boll weevil, a small beetle from Mexico, brought about much devastation throughout the U.S. agrarian South in the first half of the 1900s. And, though the actual impact of the boll weevil was real, the insect quickly emerged as the scapegoat for all problems faced by Southerners in the United States. Deteriorating quality of soil, a poor economic outlook, and failure of government leadership—all could be blamed in some form on the boll weevil. Yet, many hoped that the infestation might propel the farmers of a land often referenced by the name Cotton Kingdom to diversify and modernize. Such monumental change would come for the region, but not as a result of an agricultural pest.

Giesen readily asserts that the boll weevil is more than an agricultural pest. The boll weevil and its destructive tendencies are nothing short of an environmental disaster in the agricultural history of the United States. Yet, the author contends, studies and scholarship chronicling the sheer damaging nature of the insect fail to capture the full picture of the crushing blow that the boll weevil made to the culture and mentality of the American South. Giesen makes the striking assertion that the boll weevil is “a crucial component of the larger personal, cultural, and economic history that southerners tell of their region” (p. 175). In short, in order to understand the human experience in the American South, one must understand the powerful effect of an insect that thrives on a diet of cotton plants.

Giesen traces the movement of the fear of the boll weevil across the Rio Grande to East Texas, through the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta,

to southeastern Alabama and into central Georgia from the 1890s through the late 1920s. The advance of the phenomenon mirrors the progression of the insect itself. As it infested more and more states in the American South, farmers called for action on the part of legislators at the local, state, and national level.

Scholars offered wisdom, including recommendations to starve the boll weevil by limiting or abandoning cotton production for a season or two. U.S. Department of Agriculture entomologist Tyler Townsend pioneered a plan of attack on the boll weevil habitat. The plan, called the cultural method, proved popular with tenant farmers. The method included vigilant watchfulness for infestations, diligent weeding out of affected plants, and a simple albeit labor-intensive post-harvest process of burning and discarding old stalks, flooding irrigated fields, encouraging livestock to consume remains, and embracing crop rotation practices.

In Texas and Louisiana, African American tenant farmers employed the cultural method with notable successes. Giesen argues that tenant farmers in general were faced with only three possible solutions in regards to the threat of boll weevil infestation: "quit farming, move to another farm, or continue to live and farm alongside the insect" (p. 33). Townsend's cultural method, therefore, presented a workable approach to living and farming alongside the insect.

Regardless of the wisdom and practical experience shared by some who had success fighting boll weevil infestations, farmers resisted practical methods. Agricultural extension offices opened up throughout the American South with the purpose of educating farmers on methods of boll weevil resistance. Institutions of higher education boomed through the region as land grant colleges emerged in southern cities with various academic departments working on research methods to fight boll weevils. And groups of scholars visited communities to encourage diversification and modernization as ways to grapple not only with boll weevil problems, but also with concerns about deteriorating soil quality throughout the Cotton Kingdom. The real change that the Southern states needed could have come about as a result of new farming methods and crop variance. But Southern states refused to give up cotton.

As part of his narrative, Giesen includes several examples and excerpts from lyrical compositions, newspaper reports, pamphlets, and regional jargon concerning the boll weevil. As a descendant of West Texas cotton farmers, I found myself nodding in agreement as Giesen illuminated the mythical power of such a small pest. Giesen is right: the boll weevil holds legendary status through the cotton-pro-

ducing communities of the American South. Yet, as he aptly proves through multiple charts and tables of collected data that accompany his narrative, the insect failed to meet expectations in terms of actual damage.

So, the boll weevil could have spurred the transformation of the American South from an agricultural region dependent upon one crop in the early decades of the 1900s. But, due to resistance to change on the part of farmers and a fierce commitment to fight the insect on the part of educators, legislators, and the business community, it did not. Revolutionary transformation came later, in the aftermath of World War II. And, as Giesen writes, "In various small southern towns the boll weevil is emblazoned on city monuments and football helmets . . . 'Lest we forget'" (p. 175).

Giesen's narrative is accessible to the average reader. The history of compelling and Giesen supports his assertions with a variety of primary source material. Considering the high number of geographical references, readers unfamiliar with that region of the United States will find some of the material a bit inaccessible due to the lack of maps in the middle and later chapters of the book. And, even for U.S. readers, a map would be a welcome addition.

Overall, this is an important book in which the author illuminates a new aspect of a story that is woven deep in the fabric of identity in the United States agrarian South.

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Gilgamesh among Us: Modern Encounters with the Ancient Epic.

By THEODORE ZIOLOWSKI. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011. 240 pp. \$35.00 (cloth).

With *Gilgamesh among Us*, Theodore Ziolkowski provides the public with an engaging *tour de force* about the past century's modernization of the ancient stories about the Mesopotamian hero Gilgamesh. The main argument of the work is that "Gilgamesh constitutes a finely tuned seismographer whose reception registers to a significant degree many of the major intellectual upheavals of the past century" (p. 197). In his review of Gilgamesh's reception history, he certainly builds a compelling case. In addition, he provides the reader with an extensive bibliography about the many lives Gilgamesh enjoyed after the discovery of the *Epic of Gilgamesh* in the last part of the nineteenth century.

Gilgamesh among Us is divided into five information-packed chapters organized in chronological order and bookended by an introduction (pp. 1–19) and a conclusion (pp. 189–198). “The Initial Reception” (pp. 20–46) details the reactions to the discovery of the *Epic of Gilgamesh* up to World War II. The focus is on the German authors and artists, since, as Ziolkowski nicely illustrates, the popularization of the epic occurred in the aftermath of the Babel-Bible controversy and through German translations.

In “Representative Beginnings” (pp. 47–78), Ziolkowski focuses on four “modes of modernization” that characterized the 1940s and 1950s. These are translations; “fictionalizing and dramatic revisions of the themes;” a “postfigurative” mode, which enables modern authors to use an old mythologeme; and the thematic analogues (pp. 47–48). This is also the first time that *Gilgamesh* reaches and inspires composers, as the brief survey Ziolkowski offers (pp. 74–78) demonstrates.

“The Popularization of *Gilgamesh*” (pp. 79–108) considers the thriving period between 1959 and 1978, and investigates the growing fame of the *Epic of Gilgamesh* among the English and German speaking worlds via new translations (noteworthy is Nancy Sanders’s 1960 version, which introduced the story to generations of students). This is an extremely rich period in reception history, as *Gilgamesh* is for the first time the protagonist of historical novels and becomes an icon for the gay rights movement.

“The Contemporization of *Gilgamesh*” (pp. 109–154) looks at *Gilgamesh* in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and the final chapter, “*Gilgamesh* in the Twenty-first Century” (pp. 54–188) reviews the latest re-elaboration of *Gilgamesh* in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and in light of the most recent American and European engagements in the Middle East.

For this reviewer, *Gilgamesh among Us* is a mine of information about how the Western cultural milieu, in particular in Germany, England, and the United States, has dealt with, interiorized, and remodeled the figure of *Gilgamesh* over the course of the past century. Ziolkowski’s enthusiasm and knowledge about the topic, as well as the breath of his research, are outstanding.

This is not an Assyriological book, nor does the author pretend to be anything that he is not. Because of this, I approached *Gilgamesh among Us* exactly for what this book is, namely a study in reception history and literary criticism. Nevertheless, I find that I cannot overlook certain content errors present in the introduction. Although these mistakes do not detract from the book as a whole, they are still irritating, as they propagate among the general public common misconceptions

not only about the historical Gilgamesh but also about the Gilgamesh stories.

First, I would hesitate to go as far as to claim that "It is widely accepted that the original Gilgamesh was a historical figure" (p. 6). Rather, I would argue that Gilgamesh's historicity is by now irrelevant. This is because, on the one hand, there is at present no evidence that Gilgamesh ever existed. The earliest epigraphic evidence, which mentions his name, consists of a god list from Abu Salabikh. It mentions Gilgamesh among other gods, thus attesting to the fact already in the twenty-sixth century B.C.E. Gilgamesh had been deified (as Ziolkowski rightly points out on p. 6). On the other hand, no one would deny that the people of Mesopotamia thought Gilgamesh to be the fifth king of the first dynasty of Uruk, the one who built the massive walls associated with the city, and that, after his death, he became one of the netherworld judges.

Second, Ishtar is a goddess and not a vengeful queen (p. 6). This may seem irrelevant to a reader not versed in the multilayered meanings of the *Epic of Gilgamesh*. But the distinction is actually an important one, since it emphasizes the struggle between the divine and human planes, which not only underlies the *Epic* as a whole but is also at the foundation of Gilgamesh's nature. After all, he is two parts god and one part human. Finally, recent Assyriological publications by Antoine Cavigneaux and Farouk N. H. Al-Rawi and by Andrew George have demonstrated how the account of the flood was already present in the Sumerian forerunners to the Gilgamesh stories, as it is listed in the many deeds the king of Uruk accomplished during his life according to the Sumerian poem *The Death of Gilgamesh*.¹

These may sound as the quibbles of an Assyriologist, but they are critical to the core of Ziolkowski's discussion. As he successfully demonstrated in his book, translations and summaries of the *Epic of Gilgamesh* are at the foundation of how generations of authors, artists, composers, and poets interacted with the Mesopotamian hero. As such getting this information right is relevant to future receptions of the *Epic*.

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¹ Antoine Cavigneaux and Farouk N. H. Al-Rawi, *Gilgamesh et la mors*, Textes de Tell Haddad VI avec un appendice sur le textes funéraires sumériens (Groningen: Styx, 2000). Andrew George, *The Epic of Gilgamesh: A New Translation* (London: Penguin, 1999). Andrew George, *The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic, Introduction, Critical Edition, and Cuneiform Texts*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

The Rise of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in Western Africa, 1300–1589. By TOBY GREEN. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 366 pp. \$99.00 (cloth); \$79.00 (e-book).

Drawing on archival sources in Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean, Toby Green presents a new study of the earliest phase of European maritime activity and settlement on the Cape Verde islands and the West African coast between the Senegal River and Sierra Leone. The book examines conditions in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Iberia and West Africa that set the stage for the complex interactions between Europeans and Africans that followed, though the book primarily focuses on the period from 1460 to 1589, when Cape Verde was a hub of long-distance trade. Most of the nine chapters deal exclusively with the islands and coastal towns where Iberians conducted trade, although frequent reference is made to the African hinterland as well as locations in Europe and the Americas that were connected to Cape Verde by maritime trade.

The book provides a richly detailed analysis of the evolution of Cape Verde as both an entrepôt for trade in enslaved Africans and a very early European colony in which African slaves produced agricultural products for export. Green's use of documents from the Inquisition enables him to paint a detailed portrait of the settlers who came from Iberia in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries seeking their fortunes in the first site of what Philip Curtin has dubbed the "plantation complex." A large proportion of these settlers were New Christians of Jewish ancestry, and Green argues that their experiences with violence and exclusion in Europe shaped the ways in which they built a new society based on slavery and slave trading on Cape Verde and the African coast. One of the most intriguing ideas presented in the book is that this part of the world was simultaneously shaped by three overlapping diasporas in this period: the New Christian diaspora in Cape Verde and the Mediterranean, the diaspora of Islamic traders involved in trans-Saharan trade, and the Mandinka diaspora through which coastal Western Africans shared a cultural and linguistic link with their neighbors in the distant interior.

Green is very keen to show that he has uncovered new evidence that warrants a reassessment of the volume of the early slave trade from Upper Guinea. He makes a strong argument for the underappreciation of the Portuguese contraband slave trade and introduces evidence showing that the scale of this trade may have been quite large. For example, he demonstrates that many slave ships could have been provisioned by the increasing agricultural production in Upper Guinea

in this period. The number of enslaved Africans taken by slave ships in this period nevertheless remains extremely uncertain, however, and historians who have used quantitative methods to assess the volume of the trade will undoubtedly question Green's interpretation. Moreover, this evidence alone does not refute the generally accepted view that African gold was more important than slaves to the first generations of European traders in Africa, which Green rejects.

New evidence presented here regarding early Europeans' travels in the Americas has more potential to stimulate fruitful historical analysis. Green shows that many of the first "explorers" of the Americas, including Columbus, actually had extensive experience in and knowledge of West Africa, and that they referenced their African knowledge in their encounters with the indigenous people of the Americas. The ways in which these European travelers introduced ideas about slavery and slave trading from the Old World to the New constitute a new dimension of the ideological processes involved in the formation of the early Atlantic World.

Some readers will be put off by Green's exaggerated claims. This book certainly advances historical knowledge of the complex processes that might be called the making of the Atlantic World (à la John Thornton); however, it is a stretch to say that it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of major events in the more recent history of the world—such as the colonization of Africa and economic globalization—both of which Green refers to repeatedly in this study. Another exaggerated claim is that historians have not appreciated the impact of the decimation of the indigenous population of the Americas on the subsequent forced migration of Africans to the Americas. Undergraduate textbooks such as Lisa Lindsay's *Captives as Commodities* (Pearson, 2008) now clearly explain the labor shortage in the Americas and the way it augmented colonists' demand for slaves.

Historians of the slave trade will notice that Green does not attempt to place his study within the larger context of the transatlantic slave trade from Africa, remaining focused instead on a fixed time and place. The fact that the slave trade from Upper Guinea prior to 1589 accounts for only 1 or 2 percent of the total slave trade—even with the most generous estimates—does not deter Green from claiming to "rethink" the entire transatlantic slave trade. In his enthusiasm to emphasize the preeminence of Cape Verde and Upper Guinea in the early slave trade, moreover, he seems too eager to discredit Linda Heywood and John Thornton's work on the early slave trade from West Central Africa.

Overall, *The Rise of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in Western Africa, 1300–1589* makes a significant contribution to historical understand-

ing of the beginnings of European trade in Africa and places the Cape Verde islands in their rightful place at the center of this important story. It will interest scholars of the Atlantic World and a general audience interested in European expansion and maritime trade.

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The Lebanese Diaspora: The Arab Immigrant Experience in Montreal, New York, and Paris. By DALIA ABDELHADY. New York: New York University Press, 2011. 242 pp. \$75.00 (cloth); \$23.00 (paper).

In the spirit of unpacking the prevalent image of a monolithic uniform Middle East, Dalia Abdelhady, a senior research fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University, proposes a tantalizing journey into the discovery of *another* Middle East. Her book *The Lebanese Diaspora: The Arab Immigrant Experience in Montreal, New York, and Paris* is an important, topical, well-researched, well-written, and all around fascinating addition to the study of modern Lebanon and the “Lebanese Universe”—*le monde libanais*—as Saïd Akl termed the Lebanese diaspora.

The book begins with a word of caution to the reader against the prevalent, clichéd depictions of Lebanon and its peoples: studying the Lebanese as a monolith, notes Abdelhady, is tantamount to denuding them of their congenital diversity and slotting them into “commonalities of language and culture that are often contested” (p. ix). She further writes that she “was drawn to studying the Lebanese specifically as a result of the diversity of the community and the contentions inherent in defining a Lebanese identity” (p. ix).

Alas, Abdelhady proceeds to do exactly what she set out to avoid. Beginning with her book’s title and subtitle, polar opposites feuding for hearing and clashing for meaning, the author ends up misleading as much as illuminating. One wonders why she would promise to parse a distinct immigrant community (“the Lebanese diaspora,” as her title indicates), only to end up lumping it into a generic and widely varied “Arab immigrant experience”—a distinct and disparate experience from that of the Lebanese proper.

Abdelhady marshals a wealth of data spanning three continents and mining a wide range of Lebanese ethno-religious groups—Maronites, Melkites, Shi’ites, Sunnis, and others. And although she expertly crafts her analysis of the complex and varied ways in which those Lebanese

diasporic communities view their own identities and integrate into their host societies, she nevertheless still manages to conflate them with Arabs throughout. To wit, she gives voice to the children of the "Lebanese diaspora" defining them, in their own words, as hybrid cosmopolitan polyglots, "product[s] of two or more cultures" (pp. 61–62), "belong[ing] to multiple societies" (p. 192), "a mixture between East and West" (p. 96), and "formed at the intersection of multiple culture" (p. 84). Yet she still anchors them to an exclusivist Arab lot, foregoing not only the fluidity and diversity of identity in Lebanon proper and among her own Lebanese respondents, but also throughout the Middle East as a whole.

Clearly, there are tensions between "being Lebanese" and "being Arab," and managing this minefield certainly requires nuance, tact, and impartiality, especially in the context of value-free scholarship; that, however, does not seem to warrant Abdelhady's concern. Her lack of attention to, perhaps even her contempt for, Lebanese specificity—even when pointed out to her by her respondents—seems to be a natural order of things. What's more, commendable and crucial a study as this remains, in the aggregate, the book still leaves the reader with mixed feelings. It offers too little context to the modern Lebanese diasporic experience, and it foregoes that phenomenon's all-important mid nineteenth century progenitors and their political, social, and ethno-religious roots.

Still, this volume's major flaw remains its profound misunderstanding of the complexity of Lebanon's politics of identity, its disregard for Lebanese history, its frivolous use of the putative term "Arab" in reference to Lebanese groups that would ordinarily take great umbrage at being defined as such, and its perfunctory framing of the Lebanese experience as one of an "Arab immigrant" subgroup, even as, and by the author's own admission at times, the circumstances, framework, and agents of Lebanese immigration, as well as the Lebanese historical, national, linguistic and cultural trajectories, remain markedly distinct and different from those of Arabs proper.

Perhaps Abdelhady could have taken a cue from a number of her own Lebanese respondents, one of whom for instance maintained that restricting "his cultural repertoire to only one culture [amounted to] social and cultural death" (p. 65). In the end, probing the Lebanese diasporic experience on its own merits and in its own historical and sociological contexts, or perhaps situating it within a larger, less doctrinaire, and ultimately more accurate (and spacious) Middle Eastern cultural space, would have given more clarity, more quality, and more scholarly rigor to an otherwise supremely relevant addition to the lit-

erature on diaspora studies, the modern Middle East, and modern Lebanese history and identity.

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Refugees and the End of Empire: Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the Twentieth Century. Edited by PANIKOS PANAYI and PIPPA VIRDEE. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 328 pp. \$90.00 (cloth).

This collection establishes the links between forced migration and the end of empire, when “the decline of imperial control led to successor nationalisms, exclusionary nationalism and expulsion of people to create purist states” (p. vii). The volume is divided into three parts, with the introductory section offering three overarching frameworks. Panikos Panayi opens with a solid overview of refugee movements and imperial collapse in twentieth century Europe. He makes a persuasive case—echoed by many contributors—for a broader definition of “refugee,” or at least a willingness to place forced migrations on a spectrum that includes more extreme policies, such as ethnic cleansing, population displacement, and genocide (p. 10). Ian Talbot introduces a global, comparative perspective, including a particularly effective analysis of the settlers who fled French, Dutch, and Portuguese colonies after independence (pp. 36–38). Mark Levene examines developments in imperial “rimlands” and argues forcefully for an approach that rejects modernist paradigms with limited understandings of historical progress.

Part 2 presents original research on specific European and Middle Eastern experiences in the aftermath of the First World War. Matthew Frank examines two early proposals for population transfers, making the case that the element of legal compulsion established by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (which regulated the Greco-Turkish population exchange) was wholly new to population movements. Julie Thorpe, on the other hand, suggests that imperial policies to manage refugee flows in the Austro-Hungarian state as early as 1915 contributed to the forces that tore the empire apart. Though the imperial state passed legislation to “civilize” internal refugees, transforming them into better citizens, the creation of categories “unwittingly nationalized [the empire’s] own citizens and gave legitimacy to nationalists who sought to claim non-national people for their political projects of liberation

from imperial rule" (p. 102). Dawn Chatty and Victoria Rowe give a pair of conflicting accounts based in oral histories. Chatty sees the Middle East as a site of "residual" Ottoman tolerance "towards multi-ethnic and plural societies," where the dispossessed have found "refuge and asylum," "comfort and relief" (pp. 144–145). Rowe, however, emphasizes Ottoman policies that reinforced difference, arguing that traditional representations of non-Muslim women contributed to the pervasive use of sexual violence against Armenian refugees.

The population movements accompanying the end of British imperial rule are the subject of part 3. Pippa Virdee's examination of the subcontinent's 1947 Partition highlights the lack of planning by local and imperial authorities, who were taken by surprise when the drawing of the India-Pakistan border resulted in mass migration (ironic for an imperial power that had often encouraged such movements). Ilyas Chattha investigates Partition from the vantage point of Kashmir, arguing that much of the violence there was orchestrated by local leaders who capitalized on refugees' own desire for vengeance. Udit Sen studies the trajectory for Bengalis offered the choice to resettle in the Andaman Islands, tracing their fascinating transition from refugees to settlers. Sen calls attention to refugees' perception that the only border they crossed was the ocean, pitting the idea of new national borders against older, perhaps more natural, ones. Emma Robertson traces Asian refugees from Uganda to the unlikely destination of York. Robertson provides a coda to the policy of moving imperial subjects to where they might best serve British interests in her examination of a post-imperial desire to "disperse" British Asian refugees throughout the United Kingdom.

This collection has many strengths and makes a powerful case for the relationship between imperialism and refugee flows. It would, however, have benefited greatly from more careful copyediting; errors are frequent enough to be distracting. More important, the collection leaves two major questions unsettled. The first is whether twentieth century forced migrations represented a rupture with or an extension of imperial policy. Certainly, many of the writers see the Treaty of Lausanne as a crucial precedent or turning point. At its core, this is a debate about the potential for multinational societies. Levene explicitly writes from a perspective that values alternative, non-national identities that flourished within imperial systems; Chatty's Middle East embodies similar ideals. However, Panayi (along with Thorpe and Rowe) rejects the idea of a pre-national "golden age," asserting that "the worst acts of ethnic cleansing actually occur as a result of the actions of the former imperial power" (p. 18). Indeed, Panayi and Virdee's conclusion

remains uneasy with the continued existence of multiethnic polities in the latter half of the twentieth century, with Cyprus and Yugoslavia serving as bloody cautionary tales (pp. 275–278).

The second area of difficulty lies in the perception of refugees as victims. The editors are clearly concerned with the potential oral history offers for restoring agency, as a means of “filling [. . .] gaps and provid[ing] a more nuanced understanding of individual refugee experiences” (p. xiv). Chattha and Sen go to particular lengths to establish individual refugees’ strategies for managing trauma and retaking control of their lives. Rowe further insists on the importance of informal, non-institutional aid for refugees—“individual attitudes and informal networks can offer types of support of immediate personal consequence” (p. 169). Yet, the book concludes on the note of trauma (p. 286), leaving the reader more with a sense of victimhood than of survival and support.

Demanding definitive answers to either of these questions may be unrealistic, yet it would have been useful to see the areas of dispute addressed more openly by the editors, who might have suggested ways around apparent contradictions. Might we trace a break from older notions of imperial identity to certain points within each empire as it declined? Is virulent nationalism intrinsic or external to these imperial systems? How can we best balance the traumatic and violent experiences of refugees with their capabilities for redefining their identity and reclaiming selfhood?

This collection contributes to a global understanding of refugee movements and a departure from Eurocentrism. Sen, for example, asks that we leave behind an approach that paints Partition as “a distinctive and unique feature of South Asian history,” ignoring “clear resonances with the contemporary postwar refugee crisis in Europe” (p. 219). Virdee’s discussion of British policies that mixed populations throughout the empire likewise invites deeper comparisons with the Ottoman system, while Talbot makes a particularly compelling argument for a broad pattern of shared refugee experiences. Unfortunately, the volume’s conclusion reverts to separate summaries by region, missing an opportunity to build upon these fascinating connections for scholars and students of world history.

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