Every once in awhile I’ll mention the historical four regions in the Middle East who dominate over the centuries—Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. As Iran considers if it will change its policies practiced since 1979, it may or may not have that long-range thinking in mind, but instead the current. For example, we are reminded that “Historical enmity between the Ottomans and the Persians, and rivalry for control in various hot spots across the region, make it difficult for Turkey and Iran to create a lasting partnership.” See “Analysis: Netanyahu and Erdogan in Unlikely Alliance Against Iran in Nagorno-Karabakh?,” Anshel Pfeffer, Haaretz, September 30, 2020.
“UN nuclear watchdog inspects second Iran site,” Al Jazeera, September 30, 2020.
“Iran’s regime secluded witness to brutal torture of champion wrestler,” Benjamin Weinthal, Jerusalem Post, September 30, 2020.
“Iran Rejects UAE Claims, Reasserts Sovereignty over Trio Persian Gulf Islands,” IFP, September 30, 2020.
“Twitter removed 130 accounts linked to Iran during first US presidential debate,” Steven Musil, CNET, September 30, 2020.
It is rare to get numbers, even ballpark numbers, out of Iran’s government. Here is one of those times. Iran says it spent $19.6 billion on the 1980-1988 War with Iraq. (But the second ranking IRGC commander in the IRGC said those billions were insignificant compared to what Iran had gained financially in the region.) As much as $30 billion just on its involvement in Syria backing up Assad since 2011. The State Department reported in 2018 that the Regime had by then spent “$16 billion propping up the Assad regime and supporting its other partners and proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen since 2012.” “The report also said Iran funds Hizballah to the tune of $700 million annually and gives a further $100 million a year to Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.” See “Revolutionary Guards Commander Gives Rare Estimate Of Money Iran Spent On Proxies, Military Aid In Region,” Golnaz Esfandiari, RFE/RL, September 30, 2020.
Iran officially has a superpower in its corner, another reason it won’t easily change its pattern of behavior. “With the 25-year deal with China now moving ahead at pace, Iran has a buyer for all of the crude oil it can produce, albeit at discounted level, so Tehran is pushing oil field development across the board.” See “China Is Ready To Give Iran’s Oil Industry A Major Boost,” Simon Watkins, OilPrice.com, September 30, 2020.
“The Islamic Republic of Iran seeks friendly and brotherly relations with Tajikistan based on mutual respect, but the continuation of such behavior by the Tajik government is against the rules of friendly relations and the Tajik government must be aware of the consequences of such behavior,” the ministry was quoted as saying by Mehr news agency.” That term, “mutual respect,” is often used by Iran’s government in these contexts, to say they aren’t getting what they insist upon. See “Tajikistan revives on-off dispute with Iran,” Eurasia Net, September 30, 2020.
“What’s Iran’s role in the Armenia-Azerbaijan clash?,” Murat Sofuoglu, TRT World, September 30, 2020. A good article on this subject. “Increasing Turkish nationalism [among the Azeri Turks] in Iran has been seen as a serious political problem by Iran. Connections and relations between the country’s north [where a sizable Azeri Turkish population lives] and Azerbaijan have been an important factor in Tehran’s political problems with Azerbaijan. Some Azeris believe that Iran’s Turkic-origin population, which includes Turkmen, Qashgais and other Turkish-speaking groups, might amount to nearly 40 percent. Many Azeris call Iran’s north as southern Azerbaijan, where nearly 20 million Azeris live according to different estimates. Some Azeri nationalists and intellectuals have long defined both northern and southern parts as culturally and socially identical, arguing that they should be joined under a political union. “In Iran, due to the enormous Turkish population, there has historically been a political fear that two Azerbaijans, Baku [the capital of northern Azerbaijan] and Tabriz [the capital of southern Azerbaijan] might join at some point,” says Esref Yalinkilicli, a Moscow-based Eurasia political analyst. The political argument of Greater Azerbaijan has long been a threat for the Iranian establishment, which has used its support of Armenia as a counter-measure to minimise Azeri aspirations in Iran and across the region, says Yalinkilicli. “Iran’s traditional Armenia policy has long been a balancing act against both Azerbaijan and Turkey across southern Caucasia. As a result, behind-the-scenes, Iran backs Armenia,” Yalinkilicli tells TRT World. While Iran has a Shia majority and Azeris are overwhelmingly Shia, Azeris speak a Turkish dialect, which is very close to Turkey’s Turkish, and have established close connections with Ankara since the collapse of the communist Soviet Union.”