“Iranian Tankers Hide In Iraqi Waters To Ship Oil Abroad,” Irina Slav, OilPrice.com, October 23, 2020. “The Iraqi port of Al Faw is one regularly used point of transfer, according to the sources and the documents. There, Iranian tankers offload the crude to other vessels where it is mixed with oil from other sources, such as local crude, to avoid detection. Apparently, such transfers have grown into a lucrative business for the parties involved, who then sell the mixed oil as Iraqi. Ship-to-ship transfers, not just off the Iraqi coast but elsewhere, too, have become Iran’s go-to method of getting its crude oil to foreign buyers amid the sanctions. While production of crude oil has declined substantially following the re-introduction of U.S. sanctions against Tehran, the country is still exporting over 800,000 bpd, as of the first half of this year, according to data from TankerTrackers.com. China is Iran’s biggest oil buyer. In fact, as Simon Watkins reported earlier this month for Oilprice.com, China has been stocking up on cheap Iranian crude. Citing an unnamed oil industry source close to Tehran’s oil ministry, Watkins said China took in some 8.1 million barrels of Iranian oil between June 1 and July 21. Official reports from China said the country had not imported any Iranian crude in June.”
“Explainer: How Biden and Trump would remake the Iran nuclear deal,” Ben Piven, NPR, October 23, 2020.
“Iran Says It’s ‘Not Interested’ in Debate After Biden Warns It ‘Will Pay A Price’,” Tom O’Connor, Newsweek, October 23, 2020.
Tit for Tat. But check the record to see if the U.S. representatives were acting as the Iranian representatives. “Iran Puts Several US officials on Sanctions List,” IFP, October 23, 2020.
Iran has sent an IRGC general to act as its ambassador to Yemen, a clear violation of international law and UN resolution. We all recognize how a diplomat should not act as a military commander on a foreign field. “US slams Iran for ‘smuggling’ envoy into Yemen,” Yemen Online, FRI, October 23, 2020.
“Iran’s expanding tool kit for internal suppression,” Nicholas Carl, Critical Threats, October 23, 2020. These include disrupting domestic telecommunications to counter or preempt protests (blocking the internet), building a domestic intranet to reduce public reliance on foreign internet services, and monitoring and censoring communications.
“Syria fuel crisis eases as Iran delivers new oil supplies,” Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Reuters, October 23, 2020.
