“Two candidates drop out of Iran presidential election, due to take place Friday amid voter apathy,” AP, 6-27-24. Hashemi and Zakani withdrew to strengthen the chances of another (front-running) hardliner. This dropping out action has also occurred at other Guardian Council-Presidential races, most recently in the 2021 election. It is coordinated with the Office of the Supreme Leader in order to influence the outcome of the election.
“US intel indicates war between Israel and Hezbollah inching closer,” Politico, 6-27-24. TBD by Iran’s leaders.
So, Iran’s hold on the Strait is forcing SA to make concessions. Another successful blackmail. “Saudi Arabia said seeking China’s help in solving Houthi crisis in Red Sea,” Times of Israel, 6-27-24.
“A cold revenge: How Iran baited Israel on October 7,” JPost, 6-27-24.
“Ex-president Hassan Rouhani backs sole reformist running in Iran elections,” Dawn, 6-27-24. And Khatami the same. “Former Presidents Call on Iranians to Vote as Boycott Campaign Grows,” Iran International, 6-27-24.
“The job of Iran’s president is a study in humiliation,” Economist, 6-27-24.
Written by Sanger and Fassihi. “As Iran Picks a President, a Nuclear Shift: Open Talk About Building the Bomb,” NYT, 6-27-24. First, Iran is officially a “threshold” nuclear state. Second, “in April, Iran had fired hundreds of missiles and drones at Israel, most of which Israel intercepted. … The Iranians most likely emerged from the experience determined that the country needed a more potent deterrent.” Third point of the article, under the terms of the 2015 JCPOA Deal (which I opposed in six op-eds), “97 percent of Iran’s nuclear fuel was shipped out of the country to Russia. … But there was a weakness in the deal, acknowledged by negotiators at the time. Iran insisted that it had to hold onto its major enrichment facilities, So the underground facility at Fordow remained, spinning nonnuclear material. … So did the main enrichment site at Natanz, which is much closer to the surface and easier to destroy. … And, largely out of the sight of IAEA inspectors, Iran developed its new IR-6 centrifuges, able to produce fuel far faster than the old IR-1s.” In short, the JCPOA did not alter reality, that at its base, Iran says it doesn’t want nuclear weapons but it doesn’t act that way. Fourth, I’m glad this article included that “Iran has insisted that it cannot manufacture or use nuclear weapons because of a 2003 “fatwa,” or religious edict, issued by the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The country said the fatwa remained in effect even after Israel stole, and then made public, a huge archive of Iranian documents that made plain the country was trying to design a weapon.” But remember, as this blog has also reminded several times, the fatwa is nowhere to be seen—no official can produce a copy of it. It never existed. Last, the NYT article points out that “Iranian officials have dropped the ritual assurances that Iran has only peaceful uses in mind for its nuclear program” and mentions by name and quotes those who now say peaceful uses are not the only aim of Iran’s program: Kamal Kharazi, adviser on foreign policy to Mr. Khamenei and a former foreign minister; Abbas Araghchi, former deputy FM and a nuclear negotiator for the 2015 deal; and IRGC Gen. Ahmad Haq Taleb, commander for defending Iran’s nuclear sites.
“Iran is preparing to open a new front in its war against Israel,” Telegraph, 6-27-24.
“‘Illegal Christian activities’: Iran sentences tourist to 10 years in prison for possessing New Testament,” The Christian Post, 6-27-24.
“Iran election: Private Republican Guard polling shows Pezeshkian clear favourite,” MEE, 6-27-24.
“Iran’s only moderate presidential candidate takes surprise poll lead,” Telegraph, 6-27-24. “One observer says the popularity of Masoud Pezeshkian may force the regime to rig the result ‘more invasively than usual’.”